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CRIMINAL LAW
MENS REA FOR SEXUAL ABUSE: THE
CASE FOR DEFINING THE ACCEPTABLE
RISK
ERIC A. JOHNSON*
The persistence of strict criminal liability for child sexual abuse is
attributable, at least in part, to the shortcomings of the existing
alternatives, namely, the recklessness and criminal negligence standards.
These two standards require juries to define the acceptable level of risk on
a case-by-case basis. Juries are ill-equipped to make this calculation in
sexual abuse cases, however, and their efforts to do so almost invariably
are skewed by evidence of the victim's unchastity. This Article first
explores the shortcomings of the recklessness and criminal negligence
standards in this setting, and then attempts to develop a viable alternative.
Under the proposed alternative, the legislature, not the jury, would define
the acceptable risk of sexual imposition. It would calculate this invariant
probability threshold in much the same way that juries calculate the
acceptable risk in recklessness and criminal negligence cases-by
assigning values to the gravity of the potential harm and to the social utility
of the conduct. Under this scheme, the jury would be responsible only for
deciding whether the risk of sexual imposition exceeded this invariant
probability threshold in the defendant's case.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas1 has intensified
the debate over the constitutionality of statutes that impose strict criminal
. Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. I am grateful to
Joshua Dressier, Ernest Johnson, and Kenneth W. Simons for their comments on an earlier
draft, and to Clarissa Collier and Amy Smith for their outstanding research assistance.
Thanks also to the Carl M. Williams Faculty Research Fellowships endowment for its
generous support of this research.
1 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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liability for sexual abuse of children.2 Critics of these statutes have long
been troubled by the possibility that an actor might be convicted despite
reasonably having been convinced that his partner had reached adulthood.3
This criticism has taken on new force with Lawrence's apparent
"constitutionalization of an individual's right to sexual intimacy.",4  If
sexual relations among unmarried adults not only are lawful, but are
constitutionally protected, then-according to the critics of strict liability-
due process ought to forbid the imposition of criminal liability on an actor
who has no reason to suppose that his or her partner in consensual sex has
not reached adulthood.5 What Lawrence appears to require, on this view, is
that the Government prove some culpable mental state regarding the age
element in the crime of sexual abuse.6
2 See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 364 (2004); Arnold H. Loewy, Statutory
Rape in a Post Lawrence v. Texas World, 58 SMU L. REV. 77, 77 (2005); Jarrod Forster
Reich, Note, "No Provincial or Transient Notion ": The Need for a Mistake ofAge Defense
in Child Rape Prosecutions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 693, 723-25 (2004).
3 See Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake ofAge: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape,
64 MICH. L. REV. 105, 135 (1964) (arguing that "[t]he ideal law in this area would permit
consideration of mistake of fact as a defense to intentional crimes: (1) if unreasonable, the
mistake would be regarded as negligence; (2) if reasonable, the mistake would acquit
altogether"); Kelly Vance, Comment, State v. Elton: The Failure to Recognize a Defense to
Statutory Rape, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 437, 451-52 (arguing that "Utah's statutory rape law
should recognize a mens rea requirement as an element of the crime and a defense of
reasonable mistake as to the victim's age, which would negate the required mental state").
4 Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1650 (2004).
5 See Carpenter, supra note 2, at 364-67; Loewy, supra note 2, at 100. This argument
finds support in Alan Michaels's influential theory that strict criminal liability "runs afoul of
the Constitution if the other elements of the crime, with the strict liability element excluded,
could not themselves be made a crime." Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112
HARV, L. REV. 828, 834 (1999). In sexual abuse, the removal of the strict liability element-
the age of the child-would create an outright prohibition on sexual intercourse, which
clearly would run afoul of Lawrence. See Loewy, supra note 2, at 92.
6 See, e.g., Vance, supra note 3, at 451-52. There is an alternative to requiring the
Government to prove a culpable mental state with respect to the age element, namely,
permitting the defendant to offer an affirmative defense that he "reasonably believed the
child to be above the critical age." MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.6(1)
(1985); see also Carpenter, supra note 2, at 383 (arguing that a "defendant's reasonable
belief that the victim is of consensual age should be relevant on the issue of the defendant's
guilt"). This alternative has grave problems of its own, as I have explained in detail
elsewhere. See Eric A. Johnson, Beyond Belief: Rethinking the Role of Belief in the
Assessment of Culpability, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 503 (2006). In a nutshell, the main
problem is that even a reasonable belief can coexist with awareness of a high probability-
for example, 40%-that the belief is mistaken. Id. at 521. Few policy-makers would
conclude, given the interests at stake, that a person contemplating sex with a partner of
indeterminate age would be justified in accepting a 40% risk that his partner is underage.
See infra text accompanying notes 183-88.
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So far, the courts have proven resistant to this argument,7 perhaps with
good reason. The obvious alternatives to strict liability are the recklessness
and criminal negligence standards, at least in the many states that have
adopted the Model Penal Code's approach to culpability. s But recklessness
and criminal negligence are problematic in this setting. The trouble is that
both of these standards would require jurors to calculate the acceptable
level of risk on a case-by-case basis. 9 Both standards, in other words,
would require jurors to decide-based primarily on the jurors' own
estimates of the gravity of the harm that accompanies sexual abuse-what
probability a reasonable person would be willing to accept that his or her
partner is underage.'0 Most jurors are ill-equipped to make this calculation.
Worse, their efforts to make this calculation almost inevitably will be
skewed by evidence of the victim's unchastity.11
The solution to this problem lies in recognizing a new criterion of
culpability-a new species of mens rea-that provides an alternative to
strict liability, on the one hand, and to negligence and recklessness, on the
other. Under this new criterion of culpability, the legislature, not the jury,
would be responsible for deciding what level of risk is acceptable. The
legislature would calculate the acceptable level of risk based on legislative
assessments of both (1) the gravity of the harm that results from sexual
abuse and (2) the general social utility of sexual intercourse. The jury then
7 See United States v. Wilson, 66 M.J. 39, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2008); Maxwell v. State, 895
A.2d 327, 336 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); State v. Holmes, 920 A.2d 632, 635 (N.H.
2007); State v. Browning, 629 S.E.2d 299, 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Jadowski, 680
N.W.2d 810, 819 (Wis. 2004). For a helpful summary of the current law in all fifty states,
see Carpenter, supra note 2, at 385-91.
8 The Model Penal Code's fourfold classification of culpable mental states-
"purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently"-and its definitions of these
mental states have been extremely influential among state legislatures. See MODEL PENAL
CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 233 (observing that "virtually all recent legislative
revisions and proposals follow [the Model Penal Code] in setting up general standards of
culpability").
9 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 26, at 62 (2d ed.
1961) (explaining that the degree of risk that will qualify as unjustifiable "must vary in each
instance with the magnitude of the harm foreseen and the degree of the utility of the
conduct").
10 See id.
See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 770 (R.I. 1998) (reasoning that recognition of a
mistake-of-age defense to sexual abuse would open the door to introduction of evidence
concerning a victim's past sexual conduct); Hearings on Federal Rape Law Reform Before
the Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 114
(1984) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Leigh Bienen, Special Projects Section,
Department of the Public Advocate) ("[I]n my experience the mistake-as-to-age defense has
been used disingenuously as a strategy for introducing evidence concerning the victim's
sexual behavior and for eliciting prejudicial and hostile attitudes toward victims.").
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would be responsible only for determining whether the defendant either
culpably failed to perceive or consciously disregarded a risk that exceeded
this acceptable level. Thus the jury, instead of being asked to decide
whether the defendant was or should have been aware of a "substantial and
unjustifiable" risk that his or her partner was underage,12 would be asked to
decide simply whether the defendant was or should have been aware of,
say, a realistic possibility that his or her partner was underage.
There are precedents for defining legislatively the acceptable level of
risk. For example, the Model Penal Code's self-defense provision-like the
self-defense provisions of most state criminal codes-makes the defense
available only to actors who "believe" that force is necessary. 3 One effect
of this provision is to make the defense unavailable to an actor who is
aware of a probability greater than 50% that her use of force is not
necessary. 4 The Model Penal Code's influential definition of "knowingly"
also defines a fixed level of acceptable risk, albeit a very high one. 15 A
person acts "knowingly" only if he "is aware that it is practically certain
that his conduct will cause [the proscribed] result."'
16
This Article makes the case for a new variety of mens rea that is the
obverse of "knowingly," that is, a new variety of mens rea that establishes a
very low, fixed level of acceptable risk. In making the case for this new
mens rea, the Article will not return to first principles. It will assume that
strict liability, as traditionally defined, 17 is unacceptable for offenses that
carry severe punishment. 18 It will also assume, as do legislatures and
courts, the basic acceptability of criminal negligence, recklessness, and
12 See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d) (defining "recklessly"
and "negligently").
" Id. § 3.04(1).
14 Johnson, supra note 6, at 517-18.
15 Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be
Amended?, 1 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 189-90 (2003) (explaining that under the Model
Penal Code, "knowledge is indeed an invariant mental state; when it is required, the actor
must be aware of a 'high probability' or a 'practical certainty,' period, without regard to any
other factors").
16 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
17 Traditionally, an offense was classified as a "strict liability offense" only if one of the
offense's material elements lacked an associated mental state and, in addition, that element
was one of "the facts that make [the] conduct illegal." Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 606 (1994); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)
(explaining that the common law presumption against strict liability only applies with
respect to "elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct").
18 This assumption is not entirely uncontroversial. See Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An
Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1512, 1516 (Sanford H.
Kadish ed., 1983); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 731, 744 (1960).
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even so-called general intent as criteria of culpability.1 9 Indeed, the better
part of this Article will be devoted to showing how the new criterion of
culpability is situated in relation to these existing criteria.
Part II.A begins with a brief analysis of recklessness and criminal
negligence. This Part develops a kind of standard model for evaluating the
justifiability of risk-creating conduct. When the legislature adopts
recklessness or criminal negligence as the mens rea for the "social harm"
element of an offense, it effectively delegates to the jury the entire
responsibility for deciding whether the defendant's conduct was
unjustifiable. Accordingly, in defining recklessness and criminal
negligence, the legislature provides the jury with formulae for deciding
whether the risk was unjustifiable. It is these formulae that will serve as a
standard model and a starting point.
Part II.B explains how the legislature implements this standard model
when it creates general intent offenses, whose only culpable mental states
attach to conduct and attendant-circumstance elements. 20 Focusing on two
particular general intent offenses, drunk-driving homicide and drug-induced
homicide, this Part will show how these and other general intent offenses
can be interpreted as representing antecedent legislative determinations that
certain forms of conduct are reckless per se or negligent per se. Put another
way: when the legislature creates a general intent offense, it effectively
takes upon itself the responsibility for making the same justifiability
calculations that are delegated to the jury in cases of negligence and
recklessness. This Part demonstrates that there is nothing exceptionable
about substituting an antecedent legislative determination of justifiability
for the jury's case-specific determination.
Part III explains why none of the criteria of culpability considered so
far-not recklessness, nor criminal negligence, nor general intent-will
work in sexual abuse cases. Recklessness and criminal negligence founder
on the requirement that the jury assign a value to the gravity of the harm in
defining the acceptable level of risk. As this Part will show, even appellate
19 For criticism of the assumption that criminal negligence supplies an adequate basis for
liability, see, e.g., Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 635-43 (1963). For criticism of the assumption that
general intent supplies an adequate basis for liability, see, e.g., Larry Alexander & Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 375, 391 n.36 (2008)
(arguing that "proxy" crimes like statutory rape are necessarily "overinclusive, thereby
punishing actions that are not in themselves culpable").
20 See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969) (defining general intent offense as
an offense whose definition "consists only of the description of a particular act"); see also
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 453 (1978) (recognizing that one of




judges have proven incapable of putting aside evidence of the victim's
unchastity in defining the acceptable level of risk in sexual abuse cases. No
better can be expected of jurors. Nor can this problem be solved by the
creation of a general intent offense; the facts that signal the presence or
absence of a risk that the victim is underage are too various and too subtle
to be captured in a per se rule.
Part IV constructs an argument for defining legislatively the
acceptable risk of sexual imposition. After explaining how this hybrid
approach to the question of justifiability would operate, this Part illustrates
the point with a brief analysis of the "knowingly" and "reasonable belief'
criteria of culpability, both of which employ the hybrid approach. Then it
explains why sexual abuse lends itself to legislative calculation of the
acceptable risk and how exactly a fixed probability threshold would operate
in the sexual abuse context. Finally, Part V argues that a rule requiring
proof that the defendant "was or should have been aware" of a probability
exceeding the threshold defined by the legislature provides sufficient
assurance of the defendant's culpability.
II. Two MODELS FOR CALCULATING JUSTIFIABILITY
A. RECKLESSNESS AND NEGLIGENCE
At the core of the Model Penal Code's recklessness and criminal
negligence standards lies the idea of unjustifiable risk.21 Under the Code, a
defendant is reckless if he "consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct., 2 2 By comparison, he is criminally negligent if he "should be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct., 2 3 Both definitions, then, require the jury
"to examine the risk and the factors that are relevant to its ... justifiability"
for the sake of determining whether the risk posed by the actor's conduct
was, in fact, unjustifiable.
2 4
It would be natural to suppose that, despite this shared focus on the
justifiability of the risk, recklessness and criminal negligence differ
fundamentally even in how the justifiability of the risk is measured.
21 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d); see also Joshua Dressier,
Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander's Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REv. 955, 957 (2000) (identifying unjustifiability as "the core of
reckless conduct").
22 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c).
23 Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
24 Id. § 2.02 cmt. at 238.
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Criminal negligence, after all, is said to be an objective standard of
culpability, while recklessness is said to be a subjective one.25 Thus, it
might seem as though the definition of recklessness ought to require the
jury to address the question of justifiability "from the point of view of the
actor's perceptions. 26 Likewise, it might seem as though the definition of
negligence ought to require the jury to address the question of justifiability
"in terms of the objective view of the situation as it actually existed.,
27
Indeed, that is just what the commentary to the Model Penal Code says.
The commentary suggests that though the question of justifiability plays a
pivotal role in the definitions of both recklessness and negligence, the
perspective from which the jury addresses this question differs depending
on which standard is being applied.28
This aspect of the commentary, though, vastly overstates the
differences between recklessness and negligence. First of all, the
negligence standard is less objective than the commentary implies. The
very terms of the Code's definition of "negligently" require the jury to
consider "the circumstances known to [the actor]" in addressing the
justifiability of the risk.29 Thus, as Professor Peter Low has explained:
In spite of its concentration on objective components, the baseline for negligence is
the context as the actor perceived it. Negligence, therefore, involves a subjective
inquiry (what the actor actually knew about the context) and an objective inquiry (the
inferences that should have been drawn from what the actor knew).
30
Furthermore, the Code's definition of negligence could not really be
otherwise in this respect. Any standard of liability that "emphasizes the
justifiability of acting from an ex ante perspective' 3 1 must take into account
what the actor knew when she acted.32
25 See, e.g., John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law
Doctrine, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 123 n.73 (1996) (arguing that "[tihe Model Penal Code
terminology, for example, defines negligence in objective terms, as contrasted with
recklessness where subjective awareness is required"); Kara M. McCarthy, Note, Doing
Time for Clinical Crime: The Prosecution of Incompetent Physicians as an Additional
Mechanism to Assure Quality Health Care, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 569, 605 (1997)
(arguing that "unlike criminal negligence, recklessness is based on subjective fault").
26 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 238.
27 Id. at 241.
28 Id. at 238, 241.
29 Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
30 Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact:
Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 549 (1988).
31 Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1102 (1997) (emphasis added).
32 Id.; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 53-55 (Little, Brown
& Co. 1945) (1881) (arguing that "[s]o far.., as criminal liability is founded upon wrong-
doing in any sense, . . . [it] must be confined to cases where circumstances making the
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The Code commentary also overstates the degree to which the
recklessness standard requires the jury to evaluate the risk from the
defendant's perspective. It is true, of course, that in applying the Code's
definition of recklessness the jury must take into account what the
defendant knew-that is, "the circumstances known to him"-as it must
when it applies the Code's definition of negligence.33 Beyond this,
however, there is nothing subjective about the justifiability calculus. 34 The
principal subjective component of the recklessness standard-the
requirement that the actor be "conscious[]" of the risk-bears no relation to
the requirement that the risk be unjustifiable. The recklessness standard
does not, for example, appear to require proof that the defendant actually
was aware that the risk was unjustifiable. 35  Nor does the recklessness
standard appear to contemplate that the defendant's mistaken factual
beliefs36  or idiosyncratic moral values will play a role in the
conduct dangerous were known"); Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified
Conception of Criminal Liability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 936 (2000) (arguing that "[r]isk is
always relative to someone's perspective, a perspective that is defined by possession of
certain information but not other information"); Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore,
Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333, 358 (2002) (arguing that "there is
no such thing as an objective risk; there are only risks to be perceived from certain epistemic
vantage points"); Paul H. Robinson, Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or
Inattentiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of Risk-Creation Offenses, 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 367, 386 (2003) (observing that "risk exists only as an ex ante
perception of a chance of harm").
33 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
34 See David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L.
281, 367 (1981) (identifying subjective component of recklessness standard as requirement
that jury consider the circumstances known to the actor).
35 See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and
Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 405-06 (2001) (observing that
actor's awareness of risk satisfies requirement of conscious disregard, even where actor
believes that probability of harm is not sufficiently high to make conduct unjustifiable);
Simons, supra note 15, at 189 (arguing that "it is fairly clear from the [Model Penal Code]
commentary (though not from the text) that the defendant needs to be aware only that the
risk is substantial, not that it is unjustifiable"); see also State v. Boss, 127 P.3d 1236, 1239
n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) ("The risk of death required for recklessness and for criminally
negligent conduct is the same; the only difference between the two is whether the defendant
was aware of that risk.").
36 There is an important difference between taking into account "the circumstances
known to [the actor]," as the Code's definitions of negligence and recklessness do, and
taking into account the circumstances "as [the actor] believes them to be," as the Code's
definition of attempt does. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.01(1)(a). Belief and
knowledge are not interchangeable; a belief does not qualify as knowledge unless the belief
is true and justified. See LAURENCE BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 4
(1985). By opting for the phrase "circumstances known to [the actor]" over the phrase "the
circumstances as the actor believed them to be," the Code's drafters unambiguously signaled
that mistaken beliefs-and mistaken estimates of the relevant probabilities-do not figure
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calculus.37 Thus, the recklessness and negligence standards require more or
less the same analysis of the justifiability of the risk.
Perspective aside, though, what does it mean for a risk to be
unjustifiable in the required sense? Recent tort scholarship has emphasized
the availability of different approaches to defining the acceptable or
reasonable level of risk-imposition in cases of negligence. One approach,
for example, would require the jury to apply "various justice-based
standards that take into account the rights and relationships among the
parties. 38  Another approach, often associated with the "Learned Hand
formula," would require the jury to conduct "a straightforward balancing of
costs and benefits.,
39
Whatever the benefits of other approaches, the Model Penal Code's
definitions of recklessness and negligence plainly appear to adopt the
straightforward balancing approach.40 This is evident, for example, in the
definitions' very use of the word unjustifiable-rather than, say,
unreasonable or unacceptable-to define the acceptable level of risk-
imposition.41 In this setting, the word unjustifiable implies that a risk can
be justified, or offset, by countervailing social benefits. The same
implication can be found in the definitions' command that jurors consider
the "purpose of the actor's conduct" along with the "nature and degree" of
into the analysis of risk. Cf Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (applying
similar limitation on the calculation of probable cause: "an arresting officer's state of mind
(except for the facts he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause").
37 See Alexander, supra note 32, at 953 n.62 (arguing that "an actor's mistaken belief
that his risk-imposition is legally justifiable is, like mistakes of criminal law generally,
nonexculpatory, unless, that is, the actor's mistake is one regarding the necessity of the risk-
imposition as opposed to the worthiness of the actor's goal"); Simons, supra note 15, at 189
n.30 (remarking that "it should not be a defense that the actor believes it is justifiable to
impose a particular type of risk on another").
38 See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 145 (2003).
39 George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542
(1972).
40 Dressler, supra note 21, at 957 (arguing that "[t]o determine justifiability [in
connection with recklessness], we conduct a criminal law version of the Learned Hand
formula for measuring civil negligence"); Hurd & Moore, supra note 32, at 393 & n.144
(assuming that conduct will qualify as "reckless" under Model Penal Code only if the risk is
unjustified in the sense required by the Hand formula: "all the benefits of taking this risk
need to be factored in, balanced against the detriments of taking this risk"); Leo Katz, A
Look at Tort Law with Criminal Law Blinders, 76 B.U. L. REV. 307, 308 (1996) ("[T]he
drafters of the Model Penal Code seem to have been so taken by this claim [that the Hand
formula clearly captures our intuitions about the meaning of negligence] as to adopt a
formulation pretty close to it: They define negligence as the taking of a substantial,
unjustifiable risk.").
41 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
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the risk.42 Finally, this reading of the negligence and recklessness standards
jibes with the Code's version of the choice-of-evils defense, which
measures the justifiability of the risk according to a straightforward
balancing.43 It requires the defendant to prove, as an element of the
defense, that "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by [the] conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged. 44
When the acceptability of a risk is defined by a straightforward
balancing of aggregate costs and benefits, it is possible to express the
standard of conduct in rough mathematical terms. In torts, for example,
where the question of negligence often hinges on the adequacy of safety
measures adopted by the defendant, courts sometimes define the acceptable
risk in terms of three variables: (1) the probability that the harm will occur,
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury if it does, and (3) the cost of taking
precautions that would have prevented the harm.45 On the cost side of the
balance, then, is the harm, discounted by the likelihood that it would occur.
And on the benefit side is the money saved by the defendant in foregoing
precautions that could have prevented the harm. This is the Hand formula,
from United States v. Carroll Towing Co. :46 "[I]f the probability is called P;
the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL. 4 7
In criminal law, the benefits side of the equation is less likely to be
framed in terms of the "burden of adequate precautions" than in terms of
the "nature and purpose of [the] conduct" generally.4 8 This, of course, is
how the Model Penal Code's definitions of recklessness and criminal
negligence define this variable. This different formulation of the social
utility variable reflects the fact that the social utility of the actor's conduct
in a criminal case less often will depend on whether the defendant has taken
"adequate precautions" and more often will depend (in the words of the
Code commentary) on whether and to what extent "the actor is seeking to
serve a proper purpose [by his conduct], as when a surgeon performs an
operation that he knows is very likely to be fatal but reasonably thinks to be
necessary because the patient has no other, safer chance., 49 Thus, in the
42 Id.
43 Id. § 3.02; see also Fletcher, supra note 39, at 542 n.19 (observing that Model Penal
Code § 3.02 uses a variant of the Hand formula to define the choice-of-evils defense).
44 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.02(1)(a).
45 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 173 n.46 (5th ed. 1984).
46 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
47 Id. at 173.
48 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(c), (d).
49 Id. § 2.02 cmt. at 237.
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criminal law: if the probability of the harm occurring is called P, the gravity
of the harm is called G, and the social utility of the conduct is U, then
conduct is unjustifiably risky if PG > U
5
0
In summary, then, the widely accepted Model Penal Code definitions
of recklessness and criminal negligence require the jury to decide whether
the risk created by the defendant's conduct was unjustifiable. And this
assessment of the risk's justifiability takes the same basic form regardless
of whether the jury is applying a recklessness standard or a criminal
negligence standard. In either case, the jury is required to assess the risk on
the basis of "the circumstances known to [the defendant]" when he or she
acted.51 And, in either case, the assessment of the risk requires the jury to
determine whether the risk posed by the defendant's conduct was
"justified" by the countervailing social benefits. In other words, the
assessment of the risk requires the jury to balance the aggregate costs and
benefits in roughly the way described in the Hand formula.
B. GENERAL INTENT AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Crimes of negligence and recklessness are only two of the ways that
legislatures target unjustified risk imposition. Legislatures also target
unjustified risk imposition by creating so-called general intent offenses,
whose only culpable mental states attach to conduct and attendant-
circumstance elements.52 These general intent offenses are relevant to our
50 See Dressier, supra note 21, at 957. Dressler modifies the Hand formula somewhat
differently. He says:
We determine the extent of harm risked by the conduct discounted by its likelihood of occurring
and weigh that against the actor's motivation for the conduct (the perceived benefits, to the
individual or others, accruing from the conduct) discounted by the probability that the risky
behavior will satisfy the actor's goals.
Id.
51 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
52 See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969) (Traynor, C.J.) (defining general
intent offense as an offense whose definition "consists of only the description of a particular
act"). I use the term "general intent" advisedly. The terminology of general and specific
intent is notoriously confusing. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980). But
there is a dearth of alternatives. R.A. Duff refers to these offenses as "implicit
endangerment offenses." R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, 65 LA. L. REv. 941, 959
(2005). And Kenneth Simons refers to them as "formal strict liability" offenses. Simons,
supra note 31, at 1085-88. Neither of these alternatives appears to have gained any
following. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan use the term "proxy crimes" to
refer to offenses of this kind. See Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 19, at 391 n.36. But the
term "proxy crimes" is better reserved for crimes like possession of burglary tools, which
criminalize innocuous conduct for the sake of punishing or preventing harmful conduct that
is often associated with it. See Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2,
16-18 & n.51 (2006) (identifying "possession of burglars' tools and possession of drug
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inquiry because they show that the legislature sometimes can make for
itself the very justifiability calculation that is delegated to the jury in cases
of negligence and recklessness. Offenses of this kind are utterly
commonplace, as we will see. But the relationship between these general
intent offenses, on the one hand, and offenses of negligence and
recklessness, on the other, can best be illustrated by two particular offenses:
drunk-driving homicide and drug-induced homicide.
Most state criminal codes, in addition to the usual general prohibitions
on reckless and criminally negligent homicide, now have vehicular-
homicide statutes in which the driver's liability hinges exclusively on his or
her intoxication at the time of the fatal accident.53 These statutes do not
require the jury to make a determination that the defendant was reckless or
negligent with respect to the result element-that is, the death of a person.54
Instead, the statutes' only required mental states pertain to the conduct and
attendant-circumstance elements.55 They usually require, first, that the
defendant act purposely with respect to the conduct element-namely
driving a motor vehicle-and, second, that the defendant act knowingly
with respect to an attendant circumstance element-namely, the fact that
the defendant had consumed an intoxicant.56
A second, related example of a general intent offense is the crime of
drug-induced homicide. A substantial minority of states now have specific
drug-induced homicide statutes that supplement the states' broader general
proscriptions on reckless and negligent homicide. 57  These statutes
paraphernalia" as "proxy crimes," which "criminalize[] conduct that is not generally
criminal ... in order to punish or prevent the target criminal conduct").
53 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-8006 (2004 & Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(4) (West 2006 &
Supp. 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-306(1), (3)(b) (1995 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.12(2) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-106(b)(i) (2007).
54 See, e.g., People v. Garner, 781 P.2d 87, 89 (Colo. 1989); State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d
552, 563 (Fla. 1999); State v. Creamer, 996 P.2d 339, 343 (Kan. 2000); Reidweg v. State,
981 S.W.2d 399, 406-07 (Tex. App. 1998); Allen v. State, 43 P.3d 551, 569 (Wyo. 2002).
55 See Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864, 868 (Wyo. 1984).
56 See People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 832 (Mich. 2006) (holding that the Michigan
statute defining the offense of operation of a vehicle under the influence of a controlled
substance causing death does not require the Government to prove that the defendant knew
that he might be intoxicated; but implying that Government is required to prove that
defendant knew "that he or she had consumed an intoxicating agent"); Armyo, 678 P.2d at
868 (remarking that offense of aggravated homicide by vehicle requires proof that the
defendant became "intoxicated voluntarily to the point that he is not able to safely drive");
see also State v. Simpson, 53 P.3d 165, 167-68 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that
offense of driving while intoxicated usually requires proof that the defendant "knowingly
ingested intoxicants").
57 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(3) (2006); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-102(e)
(2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3) (West 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.3 (2006
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generally require, first, that the defendant deliver one of several specified
controlled substances-for example, heroin, methamphetamine, or
cocaine-and, second, that another person die as the result of ingesting the
controlled substance.58  The statutes do not require the Government to
prove that the defendant was reckless or negligent with respect to the social
harm that is the target of the statute.59 Instead, by way of mens rea, they
typically require the Government only to prove that the defendant knew that
he or she was delivering the controlled substance.60
To a lawyer schooled in the Model Penal Code's strict, elemental
approach to culpability, the crimes of drunk-driving homicide and drug-
induced homicide look very different from crimes like reckless homicide
and criminally negligent homicide. They look different because they lack a
culpable mental state with respect to one of their material elements. The
Model Penal Code requires, with a few insignificant exceptions, that every
material element of every criminal statute be assigned a culpable mental
state.61 Under the Code, a criminal statute that lacks a mental state with
respect to some material element is said to impose "absolute liability," and
absolute liability is absolutely forbidden.62 The offenses of reckless and
criminally negligent homicide satisfy the Model Penal Code's standard
model; they require proof of some culpable mental state with respect to
every element, including the result.
In contrast, the crimes of drunk-driving homicide and drug-induced
homicide lack a culpable mental state with respect to one of their elements.
Indeed, they lack a culpable mental state with respect to the element that is
& Supp. 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(3) (2007); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.317a (West Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.195(b) (West 2003); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2506(a) (West 1998); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-23-6 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a)(2) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4250(a) (Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.02(2)(a) (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (2007).
58 See People v. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
59 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(3) (providing explicitly that "the death is a result
that does not require a culpable mental state"); Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d at 1360 (interpreting
Illinois's statute not to require a culpable mental state with respect to the result: "The
defendant just needs to make a knowing delivery of a controlled substance, and if any person
then dies as a result of taking that substance, the defendant is responsible for that person's
death").
60 See Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d at 1360.
61 See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(1) (1985) (commanding that
statutes defining substantive offenses be interpreted to require proof of some culpable mental
state with respect to "each material element of the offense," except as provided in Section
2.05); id. § 2.05(1)(a) (providing that if an offense qualifies as a "violation," then no mental
state requirement applies).
62 See id. § 2.05.
20091
ERIC A. JOHNSON
the principal determinant of punishment: the death of a person. Drunk-
driving homicide carries a penalty that is dozens or even hundreds of times
more severe than the penalty for ordinary drunk driving.63 Likewise, drug-
induced homicide carries a penalty that is substantially more severe than the
penalty for ordinary drug dealing.64 And yet, for both of these offenses, the
element that triggers this enhanced liability-the death of a person-has no
attached culpable mental state. From the perspective of the Model Penal
Code's drafters, the fact that these statutes operate to impose liability for
homicide "based on culpability required for the underlying [offense]
without separate proof of any culpability with regard to the death" makes
them fundamentally problematic.
65
But there is another way of looking at these offenses. As Professor
Mark Kelman has pointed out, general intent offenses like drunk-driving
homicide and drug-induced homicide are related to reckless and criminally
negligent homicide in much the same way that negligence per se is related
to ordinary negligence.66 What differentiates these two relatively novel
forms of homicide from the more traditional offenses of reckless
manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide is just the identity of the
decision-maker. 67 Instead of requiring a jury to make an ad hoc, case-by-
case determination of unreasonableness, these statutes "require an
antecedent [legislative] judgment of per se unreasonableness. ' 68  The
legislature, not the jury, assumes the responsibility for balancing the three
63 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008)
(providing that maximum sentence for drunk-driving homicide is fifteen years'
imprisonment); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-106(b) (2007) (providing that maximum sentence
for "aggravated homicide by vehicle" is twenty years' imprisonment).
64 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317a (West Supp. 2008) (providing that
drug-induced homicide is "punishable for life or any term of years"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
2-108 (2007) (providing that "[d]rug induced homicide is a felony punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years").
65 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. at 31-32 (explaining the
operation of the felony-murder rule at common law and classifying felony-murder as an
absolute liability offense).
66 Kelman, supra note 18, at 1516 (arguing that "the key to seeing strict liability as less
deviant in the criminal justice system is . . . to see the real policy fight as a rather balanced
one over the relative merits and demerits of precise rules (conclusive presumptions) and
vague, ad hoc standards (case-by-case determinations of negligence)"). Kelman's operative
definition of "strict liability," like the Model Penal Code's, is broad enough to encompass
most general intent offenses as well. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 45, at 229-30
(explaining the operation of "negligence per se" in tort cases).
67 Kelman, supra note 18, at 1517 (raising the possibility that the legislature "might
predefine what constitutes 'reasonable care').
68 Wasserstrom, supra note 18, at 744 (discussing strict liability; Wasserstrom also
characterizes this antecedent legislative judgment as "similar to a jury determination that
conduct in a particular case was unreasonable").
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factors in the justifiability calculus: the social utility of the actor's conduct,
the gravity of the potential harm, and the probability that the harm will
come about as a result of the conduct.
The first of these factors-the social utility of the actor's conduct-
clearly lends itself to antecedent legislative determination in both drunk-
driving homicide and drug-induced homicide. Both statutes define with
specificity the conduct that will trigger liability-drunk driving in the one
case, and the delivery of drugs in the other. There is nothing controversial
in the legislature's antecedent determination that the delivery of heroin,
cocaine, or methamphetamine to other persons lacks any redeeming social
value. To be sure, drunk driving has greater social value than drug dealing;
it serves the same basic need for mobility that ordinary driving does. But,
again, there is nothing very controversial about the legislature's assumption
of the responsibility for assigning a value to the utility of driving. The
social value of driving, though not constant, varies only within a narrow
range. And for those rare cases where driving serves a compelling social
need-say, the delivery of a sick child to the hospital-the necessity or
choice-of-evils defense is available to the driver.
69
The second factor in the justifiability calculus-the gravity of the
potential harm-is even more clearly within the competence of the
legislature. The gravity of the potential harm is a factor separate, and
different in kind, from the probability of the harm occurring. The gravity of
the harm presents a question of value, while the probability of the harm
occurring is a question of fact.v° Questions of value, of course, are uniquely
well-suited to legislative determination v.7  And the value to be assigned to
69 See People v. Pena, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the
duress defense is available in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated when the unlawful
act is performed by defendant to prevent imminent harm from coming to a third party).
70 The Model Penal Code recognizes this distinction in the related context of the choice-
of-evils defense. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.02 cmt. at 12-13. As the Code
commentary explains, a defendant's assertion of the choice-of-evils defense raises a question
of value that is distinct from any factual assessment of the probability of either "evil"
coming to pass. Id. This question of value, as distinct from the factual question, "is not
committed to the private judgment of the actor." Id. at 12; see also Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d
977, 980 n.6 (Alaska 1979) (recognizing that the necessity defense raises the question
"whether the defendant's value judgment was correct, given the facts as he reasonably
perceived them"). Notably, the commentary to the choice-of-evils provision also
acknowledges that the legislature's judgment on questions of value trumps the judgment of
the finder of fact: "[T]he general choice of evils defense cannot succeed if the issue of
competing values has been previously foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice." MODEL
PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.02 cmt. at 13.
71 Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L.
REV. 21, 47 (1949) ("The legislative process includes opportunities to arrive at informed
value judgments superior to the opportunities of judges and jurors.").
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the death of a person is no exception. 7' There is nothing controversial,
then, in the legislature's decision to assign a value to the gravity of the
potential harm from either drug dealing or drunk driving.
It is the third factor in the justifiability calculus-the probability of the
harm occurring-that appears to make these statutes problematic. Recall
that the unjustifiability of conduct has to be judged on the basis of what the
defendant knew when he or she acted, rather than on the basis of how
things later turned out.73 This is true when the jury makes a case-specific
determination of unjustifiability, and it ought equally to be true when the
legislature makes a categorical determination of unjustifiability per se. This
means, though, that the legislature has to evaluate the probability of the
harm occurring on the basis of what the defendant knew. This evaluation
seems problematic at first glance because, whatever the legislature's
competence in assigning values to the conduct's social utility or to the
gravity of the potential harm, the legislature seems ill-equipped to decide in
advance what circumstances will be known to a particular future actor when
he or she acts.74
This first glance is deceiving, however. In statutes that define offenses
like drunk-driving homicide and drug-induced homicide, the legislature
takes a foolproof approach to identifying just those cases where the
defendant knew of the circumstances that made his or her conduct
unjustifiably risky: namely, it requires the Government to prove that
knowledge. In drunk-driving homicide, for example, the Government is
required to prove that the defendant knew he or she was driving a motor
vehicle and knew he or she had consumed an intoxicant. 75 And in drug-
induced homicide, the Government is required to prove that the defendant
knew that the substance he or she was delivering really was, say, cocaine or
heroin.76 Thus, the legislature's antecedent determination that the conduct
72 See Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 761 (Md. 1993) (concluding that questions going to
the value of human life are "quintessentially legislative").
73 Alexander, supra note 32, at 936 (arguing that "[r]isk is always relative to someone's
perspective, a perspective that is defined by possession of certain information but not other
information"); Hurd & Moore, supra note 32, at 358 (arguing that "there is no such thing as
objective risk; there are only risks to be perceived from certain epistemic vantage points").
74 But cf Kelman, supra note 18, at 1517 (arguing that "[tlhe problem [with general
intent statutes] is that this centralized [legislative] command may be imperfectly tuned to the
precise circumstances of each potential defendant").
75 See People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 832 (Mich. 2006) (implying that Michigan's
version of drunk-driving homicide requires the Government to prove that the defendant
knew "that she had consumed an intoxicating agent").
76 People v. Faircloth, 599 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992) (interpreting Illinois's
drug-induced homicide statute to require proof that the defendant made "a knowing delivery
of a controlled substance").
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is unjustifiable per se is-like the jury's ad hoc, case-by-case
determination-grounded on inferences from "the circumstances known to
[the actor]. 77 The legislature's reliance on these known circumstances as
the basis for calculating the justifiability of the risk is no more inherently
suspect than is the jury's.
In this respect, statutes that define crimes like drunk-driving homicide
and drug-induced homicide are fundamentally different from statutes that
impose strict criminal liability. A statute that imposes strict liability might,
in some sense, be based on a legislative judgment that the defendant
accepted an unjustifiable risk 78 But this judgment will be grounded on how
things turned out after the fact, not on the Government's proof of
"circumstances known to [the actor]" ex ante.79 Take, for example, statutes
that impose strict liability for sexual abuse. In these statutes, the only
required mental state is the defendant's knowledge that he or she was
engaged in sexual relations with another person.80  But the defendant's
mere knowledge that he or she was engaged in sexual relations with another
person cannot, by itself, provide a basis for inferring that the defendant also
was, or should have been, aware that his or her partner was underage. The
only basis for this inference is the fact that the partner turned out, after the
fact, to be underage. In other words, from the fact that the defendant's
partner turned out to be underage, the legislature infers that the defendant
could not have remained unaware of a substantial risk that the partner was
underage. 8 '
There is a difference, then, between (1) statutes in which the
legislature's per se determination of unjustifiable risk is grounded on the
government's proof of circumstances known to the actor ex ante and (2)
77 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d) (1985).
78 Wasserstrom, supra note 18, at 744 (arguing that "strict criminal liability is similar to
a jury determination that conduct in a particular case was unreasonable").
79 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
80 See Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 115-16 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that
common law sex offenses required the Government to prove by way of mens rea only "that
the defendant voluntarily committed an act of sexual intercourse").
81 This inference is evident, for example, in the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 2243,
which denies the mistake-of-age defense to anyone who engages in sexual relations with a
child under twelve years old. 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). In adopting this section, Congress
appears to have relied in part on a determination that "'no credible error of perception would
be sufficient to recharacterize a child [who is under twelve years old] as an appropriate
object of sexual gratification."' H.R. REP. No. 99-594, pt. 2, at 15-16 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6195-96 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.6
cmt. at 414). Likewise, the Ohio legislature imposed strict liability on the basis of its
determination that no actor who engages in sexual relations with a child under thirteen
realistically could remain unaware of some risk that the child is not an appropriate partner.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(b) (West 2006) (committee comment on H 511).
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statutes in which the legislature's per se determination of unjustifiable risk
is grounded, at least in part, on "how things turned out." And this
difference roughly corresponds to the traditional boundary between general
intent offenses and strict liability offenses. Traditionally, a statute was said
to impose strict criminal liability if it lacked a culpable mental state with
respect to one of "the facts that make [the] conduct illegal. 82  In strict
liability, the way things turn out-for example, the fact that one's partner
turns out to be underage-is among the facts that make the conduct
criminal. 83 By contrast, in crimes like drunk-driving homicide and drug-
induced homicide, the way things turn out is not among the facts that make
the conduct criminal. Drunk driving and drug dealing are criminal
regardless of how things turn out-regardless of whether somebody dies.
This point does not only highlight the distinction between strict
liability crimes and crimes like drunk-driving homicide and drug-induced
homicide. It also highlights the close relationship between these two forms
of homicide and more commonplace offenses like drunk driving and drug
dealing. Drunk driving and drug dealing are just the inchoate versions of
drunk-driving homicide and drug-induced homicide. 84 Moreover, like these
homicide offenses, drunk driving and drug dealing appear to be based on
antecedent legislative determinations of unjustifiability per se. That is, they
appear to be based on legislative determinations that anybody who
82 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); see also United States v.
Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941) (Learned Hand, J.) (distinguishing general
intent offenses, which require proof that the defendant was "aware of the existence of all
those facts which make his conduct criminal," from strict-liability offenses, which do not).
83 But cf Simons, supra note 31, at 1090. Professor Simons appears to deny the
distinction between the two kinds of offenses. Simons first hypothesizes the creation of a
general intent offense that makes it a crime to knowingly light a match in or near a forest.
Id. at 1086. Then he asks:
[l]f the state cannot legitimately punish an "innocent" or "nonculpable" person whose actions
merely causally contribute to starting a fire [i.e., if the state cannot punish a person on the basis
of how things turn out] ... why can the state treat as "guilty" or "culpable" someone who
knowingly lights a match simply because this crime contains a formal fault element?
Id. at 1090.
84 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, A Reckless Response to Rape: A Reply to Ayres and Baker,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 637, 665 (2006) (observing that "DUI laws criminalize an inchoate
act-by driving intoxicated, one takes the risk that one might kill another person"); Douglas
Husak, Applying Ultima Ratio: A Skeptical Assessment, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 535, 543
(2005) (arguing that "a proscription of drug use, no less than a proscription of drug
possession, is an inchoate offense" and that "[n]o harm need occur on the literally tens of
billions of occasions in which drugs have been consumed"); Christopher Slobogin, A
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 5 (2003) (characterizing driving
while intoxicated as an "inchoate crime[]").
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knowingly drives while intoxicated, or who knowingly sells cocaine or
heroin, has created an unjustifiable risk of harm to other persons.85
There is room for disagreement on the question whether statutes like
these are desirable 86 -that is, whether society is better served by bright-line
rules embodying antecedent legislative determinations of unjustifiability
per se87 or instead is better served by statutes that delegate to the jury the
responsibility for making ad hoc, case-by-case determinations of
unjustifiability. 88 What is not subject to disagreement, though, and what is
critical to the argument here, is that legislatures traditionally have made
extensive use of both kinds of criminal statutes. 89 When the problem to be
addressed lends itself, as drunk driving and drug trafficking do, to the
adoption of per se rules that embody antecedent legislative judgments about
the unjustifiability of risk, legislatures usually adopt per se rules.90 In other
settings, where "it is impossible to articulate in advance specific rules to
cover the full range of ways in which one might be at fault and risk harm to
85 See Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 321 (2002) (arguing that "many statutory inchoate offenses,
while not formally defined in terms of risk-creation or negligence, are in substance
derivative legal norms, since the reason for punishing the relevant conduct is to avoid a more
serious, primary harm").
86 See, e.g., Duff, supra note 52, at 960-61 (describing the relative advantages and
disadvantages of per se rules, on the one hand, and vaguer, ad hoc standards, on the other);
Kelman, supra note 18, at 1517 (describing the same).
87 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (Marshall, J.) (arguing
that one of the vices of vague criminal laws is that they "impermissibly delegate[] basic
policy matters to ... juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application"); HOLMES, supra note 32, at
97-102 (arguing that "it is very desirable to know as nearly as we can the standard by which
we shall be judged at a given moment").
88 See Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 620-22 (1998) (arguing that offenses like drunk driving should
either (1) be redefined to require proof of culpability-that is, recklessness-with respect to
the ultimate social harm that is the target of the offense or (2) be replaced by "a more general
offense of risk creation"); Cynthia Lee, "Murder and the Reasonable Man " Revisited: A
Response to Victoria Nourse, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 301, 305-06 (2005) (arguing that "the
jury is a better institutional actor than the legislature when it comes to deciding questions of
culpability"); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974, 2036-39
(2008) (arguing that justice and racial equality can best be served by "defin[ing] criminal
prohibitions more vaguely").
89 But cf Kelman, supra note 18, at 1517 (characterizing as "perfectly traditional" the
policy choice "between strict, easily applied rules and vaguer, ad hoc standards").
90 Indeed, delegating the normative judgment to the jury when the circumstances clearly
lend themselves to the adoption of a per se rule probably would raise constitutional
vagueness concerns. See State v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132, 1135, 1138 (Mont. 1998) (striking
down as unconstitutionally vague a Montana law that replaced traditional per se speed limits
with flexible rule requiring drivers to drive "at a rate of speed no greater than is reasonable
or proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation").
2009]
ERIC A. JOHNSON
others,"9' legislatures delegate to the jury the responsibility for deciding
whether the defendant's conduct was unjustifiably risky.92
III. WHY NEITHER NEGLIGENCE, NOR RECKLESSNESS, NOR GENERAL
INTENT PROVIDES A WORKABLE MENS REA FOR SEXUAL ABUSE
A. WHY NEGLIGENCE AND RECKLESSNESS DO NOT WORK
In theory, criminal negligence ought to function perfectly as the
culpable mental state for the age element in the crime of child sexual abuse.
Under a criminal negligence standard, again, the acceptable probability of
social harm varies with (1) the gravity of the potential harm and (2) the
degree of utility of the conduct. 93 In theory, then, a jury instructed on the
standard definition of criminal negligence in a sexual abuse case would be
able to calculate, on the basis of these factors, the acceptable probability
that the defendant's partner was underage.94 It then would decide simply
whether the defendant was or should have been aware of a probability
greater than this that his or her sexual partner was underage.
In practice, though, juries are ill-equipped to assess the gravity of the
harm wrought by sexual abuse. The difficulty is not that most jurors lack
direct experience of sexual abuse. Most jurors also lack direct experience
of, say, the grave physical injuries that result from gun shots and
automobile accidents, but they are no less capable for that of deciding
whether the defendant was negligent or reckless in shooting or driving. The
real trouble is that the harm wrought by sexual abuse is not intuitively
obvious in the way that physical disability or disfigurement is, nor is it a
matter of common knowledge. Moreover, the criminal trial is not an
91 Simons, supra note 85, at 309.
92 See Stanko, 974 P.2d at 1147 (rejecting constitutional vagueness challenge to statute
prohibiting reckless driving); Rabuck v. State, 129 P.3d 861, 864-68 (Wyo. 2006) (rejecting
constitutional vagueness challenge to broad statute defining offense of "indecent liberties").
93 WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 26, at 62 (explaining that the degree of risk that will qualify
as unjustifiable "must vary in each instance with the magnitude of the harm foreseen and the
degree of the utility of the conduct").
94 In a sexual abuse prosecution, the age of the child is, in the terminology of the Model
Penal Code, an attendant circumstance element rather than a result element. See MODEL
PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 1.13(9) (1985). In the crime of sexual abuse, though, as in
the crime of rape, the critical attendant circumstance element serves as a kind of final proxy
for social harm. See Julian Hermida, The Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law in
the Criminal Theory Realm, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 163, 198 (2003) (observing
that social harm may "adopt the form of' an attendant circumstance element). But cf Peter
Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
333, 346 (2004) (identifying "the primary harm that rape statutes seek to prevent" as the
harm of being "subjected to sexual intercourse without.., having subjectively chosen it").
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appropriate forum for a broad discussion of the harm typically wrought by
sexual abuse. The dangers of addressing such questions in a criminal trial
are reflected, for example, in the traditional rule precluding prosecutors
from injecting issues broader than guilt or innocence into the trial. 95 They
are reflected, too, in the rule barring admission of evidence of the
psychological trauma suffered by the victim herself. 96
Worse, under a negligence standard, the jury's exercise of its broad
power to establish an appropriate standard of care almost inevitably would
be affected by evidence of the victim's unchastity. In nearly every case, the
jury would hear evidence that the victim had given her consent to the sexual
encounter with the defendant, or had even initiated it. And in many if not
most cases, the jury also would hear evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct. 97 The victim's prior sexual conduct would be relevant and
admissible to explain why the defendant believed that the victim had
reached the critical age.98 Consider, for example, Bibbs v. State,99 where
the defendant, Charles Bibbs, raised a mistake-of-age defense to a charge
that he had sexually abused a thirteen-year-old girl, identified as D.C. in
court documents. 100 At his trial, Bibbs attempted to introduce "the content
of his initial telephone conversation with D.C. in which he claim[ed] she
95 Courts generally hold that the prosecutor must refrain from making "'argument[s]
which would divert the jury from its duty to decide [a] case on the evidence, by injecting
issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused' into the trial." State v.
Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 40 n.3 (Minn. 1994) (quoting 1 AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING
COMM. ON Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-5.8(d) (2d ed. 1986)).
96 See State v. Buttner, 458 N.W.2d 390, 1990 WL 100365, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)
(unpublished table decision) (holding that admission of evidence of psychological trauma
suffered by victim of sexual assault was inadmissible); see also White v. State, 80 P.3d 642,
649 (Wyo. 2003) (holding that "[v]ictim impact testimony must not be permitted [during
trial on question of guilt] 'unless there is clear justification of relevance'). Professor
Cynthia Lee argues that the solution to problems of bias in criminal cases lies in the
education ofjurors: "Prosecutors simply need to do a better job of educating jurors whenever
there is a risk that race, gender, or sexual orientation bias may affect the way jurors view a
case." Lee, supra note 88, at 306. This seems problematic for a number of reasons. For one
thing, conducting quasi-legislative hearings in every criminal case would be very time-
consuming and perhaps very confusing. For another, assigning prosecutors an "educational"
function in the trial process might fundamentally alter the adversarial system and undercut
the presumption of innocence.
97 See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 770 (R.I. 1998) (reasoning that recognition of a
mistake-of-age defense to sexual abuse "would open the door to the introduction of evidence
concerning a victim's past sexual conduct"); Hearings, supra note 11, at 114 (statement of
Leigh Bienen) (stating that "in my experience the mistake-as-to-age defense has been used
disingenuously as a strategy for introducing evidence concerning the victim's sexual
behavior and for eliciting prejudicial and hostile attitudes toward victims").
98 See Yanez, 716 A.2d at 770.
99 814 P.2d 739, 740 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
'oo Id. at 739.
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discussed her prior sexual history and experience in detail."' ' Bibbs also
"sought to question D.C. about the specific details she discussed with Bibbs
on the telephone.' 1 2 The trial court excluded this testimony.' °3 But the
appellate court reversed Bibbs's conviction after concluding that "Bibbs
was entitled to develop the substance of this conversation.' 0 4
A jury that is exposed to evidence of this sort-to a detailed account of
the victim's "prior sexual history and experience"-may be inclined to
view the victim as unworthy of the law's protection.'0 5 The negligence
standard, moreover, gives the jury a clear and seemingly legitimate avenue
for putting this perception to use. Again, the negligence standard requires
the jury to assign a value to the "gravity of the harm" in calculating the
acceptable probability that harm will occur. 0 6 Where the jury concludes
that the victim was already sexually "sophisticated" when the abuse
occurred, 10 7 it may well infer that the potential incremental harm from the
victim's sexual encounter with the defendant was minimal. 0 8  The
negligence standard, then, gives the trier of fact a license to take the
victim's unchastity into account in calculating the acceptable probability of
harm under the circumstances of the case.
This is more than speculation. The reported decisions on mistake-of-
age are shot through with otherwise irrelevant comments by appellate
judges on the unchastity of the victim. In these decisions, the victim's
unchastity is not offered up as a basis for concluding that the defendant was
misled by the victim's apparent sexual maturity. Rather, it is offered to
101 Id.
102 id.
103 Id. at 740.
104 Id. at 740-41.
105 See United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-72 n.3 (8th Cir. 1978) (acknowledging
the "highly prejudicial effect" of evidence of rape victim's unchastity).
106 See 1 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(a)(1), at 317 (2d ed.
2003).
107 State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 732 (Utah 1984).
108 See id. at 732 (implying that interests protected by sexual abuse laws are not at stake
where minor is sexually "sophisticated"); Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 815 n. 15, 816 (Md.
1993) (Bell, J., dissenting) (arguing that "it would seem reasonable ... to introduce
evidence of the minor's maturity, sophistication, and past sexual experience, since maturity,
not age, is the chief concern, age being but a factor"). This view is in keeping with the
traditional view that the harm in statutory rape lies in the moral contamination of the victim.
See Abbott v. People, 16 P.2d 435, 438 (Colo. 1932) (Butler, J., dissenting) (arguing that
statutory rape law was intended "to save [the victims] from moral contamination"); Samuel
H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of Forced Sex, 35 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 845, 880 (2002) (explaining that, on the traditional view, "the victim's sexual
virtue-a moral quality-was taken from the offender via sexual invasion .... If the victim
had previously been virginal, she lost her innocence forever").
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show either that the victim did not suffer the harm that is the law's target, or
that the real fault lay with the victim rather than her adult abuser.
Consider, for example, the California Supreme Court's landmark
decision in People v. Hernandez,10 9 where the court adopted a "reasonable
mistake" defense to the crime of statutory rape.110  In support of its
conclusion that the defense was necessary, the court relied in part on the
fact that some victims of sexual abuse are "sexually experienced." ' To
illustrate, in the court's words, the "inequitable consequences to which we
may be led" by the imposition of strict liability for sexual abuse, the court
quoted at length from a 1923 decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, State
v. Snow,112 where the Missouri court had commented on the character of the
fourteen-year-old victim:
This wretched girl was young in years but old in sin and shame. A number of
callow youths, of otherwise blameless lives ... fell under her seductive influence.
They flocked about her,.., like moths about the flame of a lighted candle and
probably with the same result. The girl was a common prostitute .... The boys were
immature and doubtless more sinned against than sinning. They did not defile the
girl. She was a mere "cistern for foul toads to knot and gender in." Why should the
boys, misled by her, be sacrificed? What sound public policy can be subserved by
brandin1 them as felons? Might it not be wise to ingraft an exception in the
statute?
The description of a fourteen-year-old girl as a "mere 'cistern for foul
toads to knot and gender in"' must have sounded jarring even in 1964,
when Hernandez repeated it. But the same description was used again
thirty years later by a dissenting judge in Garnett v. State.' 14 In Garnett, as
in Hernandez, the question was whether the court should recognize a
mistake-of-age defense to sexual abuse despite clear indications of contrary
legislative intent.1 15 A majority of the Maryland Court of Appeals declined
to recognize the defense.1 16 But Justice Robert Bell dissented.117 Justice
Bell argued that "it would seem reasonable to allow the accused to
introduce evidence of the minor's maturity, sophistication, and past sexual
'0' 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
"0 Id. at 677.
... Id. at 674.
112 Id. at 674 & n.I (quoting State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629, 632 (Mo. 1923)).
"3 Snow, 252 S.W. at 632. The phrase "a cistern for foul toads to knot and gender in" is
from Othello, Act 4, scene 2, where Othello tells Desdemona that his heart, "the fountain
from the which my current runs," has run dry and so should be discarded, or else kept as "a
cistern for foul toads to knot and gender in." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 4, sc. 2.
114 632 A.2d 797, 816 n.17 (Md. 1993) (Bell, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 800.
16 Id. at 805.
117 Id. at 807 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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experience, since maturity, not age, is the [law's] chief concern."'1 8 Bell's
argument was not that the victim's apparent sexual maturity sometimes
misleads actors. Rather, his argument was that sexually experienced
children (the victim in Garnett was thirteen years old) do not suffer the
social harm that is the law's target and so do not deserve protection. To
illustrate the considerable danger posed by wily adolescent seductresses-
to whom hapless men, young or just young in spirit, are drawn like "moths
around the flame of a lighted candle"--Justice Bell quoted at length from
the Snow decision.'1 19
The stock image of the adolescent femme fatale made yet another
appearance in State v. Elton,120 where the Utah Supreme Court held that in
sexual abuse prosecutions, the Government is required to prove that the
defendant was negligent with respect to the victim's age. 121 In explaining
this standard, the court implied that a misrepresentation by the victim of her
age would be of more or less dispositive significance on the question of the
defendant's negligence. 22  But the Utah court's decision to assign
dispositive significance to the victim's misrepresentation was not based on
an assumption that such misrepresentations are always credible. Rather, the
decision was based on an assumption that the societal interest protected by
the sexual abuse laws-the moral purity of the victim-is not really in play
44 ,123"where a young participant intentionally misrepresents his or her age.
In cases like these, the court said, the mistake-of-age defense is necessary to
protect the "honestly misled party" from "a sophisticated youth who seeks
to abuse the criminal law for his or her own sensual indulgences. '' 124 In
support of this proposition, the court cited the Missouri Supreme Court's
1923 decision in Snow.
125
There are several interrelated assumptions at work in Snow and its
progeny. First, there is the assumption that the purpose of the sexual abuse
laws is to protect children from moral contamination, and that a thirteen- or
118 Id. at 814 n.15.
119 Id. at 816 n.17 (quoting State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629, 632 (Mo. 1923)).
120 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984).
121 Id. at 729-30.
122 Id. at 731-32.
123 Id. at 732.
124 Id.; see also id. at 731 (explaining that the real blame of sexual abuse often lies with a
victim "who created the deceit and entrapped the defendant into committing a crime he or
she attempted to avoid").
125 Id. at 732 (citing State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629, 632 (Mo. 1923)). The court also
relied on Vance, supra note 3, at 452. Vance, a student author, argued that the court or the
legislature "should make allowance expressly for those men and women who engage in
sexual intercourse with sexually sophisticated children or innocent children who deliberately
mislead their partner."
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fourteen-year-old girl who has previously been sexually abused therefore
has nothing to lose by being re-victimized by another adult., 26 Second,
there is the assumption that a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old girl who
responds to earlier abuse by "sexually acting out ' ' 127 is morally responsible
for her misbehavior to the degree that she may fairly be characterized as "a
mere cistern for foul toads to knot and gender in."' 128 Finally, there is the
seemingly inconsistent assumption that an adult man who falls under the
"seductive influence"' 129 of a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old girl is morally
blameless. 1
30
To the degree that a state legislature rejects these assumptions-to the
degree that the state legislature wants to protect even unchaste children
from sexual imposition by adults-the legislature would be ill-served by
making negligence or recklessness the culpable mental state with respect to
the child's age. Many jurors would bring to the jury room the same
assumptions that were at work in Hernandez, Elton, and Garnett. The
assumption that unchaste children are not harmed by sexual abuse would be
put to use by these jurors in calculating the acceptable level of risk, as
would, presumably, the assumption that the victim bore the primary moral
responsibility for what happened. In addition, the related assumption that
adult men are helpless to resist the seductive influence of adolescent girls
would influence the jury's exercise of its second distinct function in
negligence and recklessness cases: making the normative determination
whether the defendant deserves condemnation.13'
B. WHY PER SE RULES DO NOT WORK
Ordinary per se rules do not supply the answer to the problem of mens
rea for sexual abuse, either. The facts that signal the presence or absence of
126 Cf Rabuck v. State, 129 P.3d 861, 866 (Wyo. 2006) (rejecting the defendant's claim
that purpose of sexual abuse law was to preserve the "morals" of the victim and concluding
that "a more accurate statement of the policy behind the indecent liberties statute is 'to
protect children from exploitation').
127 KAREN L. KINNEAR, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 18 (2d ed.
2007) (identifying sexual "acting out" as one of the potential effects of childhood sexual
abuse).
128 People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 674 n.1 (Cal. 1964) (quoting Snow, 252 S.W. at
632); cf Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory
Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 18 (1994) (challenging the assumption that a
teenage girl's consent to sexual intercourse is "freely chosen"; "[w]hile girls may dress and
act like sexy women, they are still girls").
129 Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 674 n.1 (quoting Snow, 252 S.W. at 632).
130 Cf V.F. Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and the Idea
of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 361, 374 (2004) (attributing to John Stuart
Mill the insight that "our ideas of self-control ... are infused with notions of inequality").
131 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 238, 241 (1985).
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a risk that one's partner is underage are too various and too subtle to be
captured, even in substantial part, by a per se rule. An inexhaustible variety
of contextual facts will play a role in fostering or dispelling concerns about
age: Did the defendant meet his partner at the office? Or did he meet her at
the mall? Does the partner listen to the latest college-radio, alt-rock
sensation? Or does she listen to Miley Cyrus? Contextual variety is only
part of the problem, however. In the ordinary case, the actor will rely
heavily on very subtle visual and auditory cues in assessing his partner's
age. He will rely, for example, on the tone of her skin, and on his innate
knowledge that a woman's "eyes will look smaller and her nose larger as
she ages."'132 None of these subtle visual and auditory cues is sufficiently
regular or measurable to be of use in formulating a per se rule for sexual
conduct.
The only practicable way to formulate a per se rule for sexual abuse
would be to impose a specific affirmative duty on each partner to verify his
or her partner's age before engaging in sexual relations. The law might, for
example, require each partner to demand a government-issued identification
card from the other. A person who failed to make the required
identification check would be guilty of sexual abuse if his or her partner
turned out to be underage. And if the partner did not turn out to be
underage, the actor would presumably be guilty of an inchoate version of
the same offense. No state. appears to have taken this approach to sexual
abuse, and probably with good reason. This approach seems vulnerable to
the same sort of criticism that was directed at the Antioch College Sexual
Offense Policy, which required Antioch students to obtain verbal consent
before moving to a "higher level of sexual intimacy. 133 If a requirement of
verbal consent could be said to "stultify relationships between men and
women on the cusp of adulthood," 134 worse could probably be said of a
requirement that each person check his or her partner's identification before
sex. 135
132 ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY
LIFE 65 (1994).
133 Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 179, 204
(2004) (describing Antioch policy and recounting criticism of the policy).
134 Sarah Crichton, Sexual Correctness, NEWSWEEK (N.Y.), Oct. 25, 1993, at 52.
135 At least one state has adopted a statute that appears to strike a compromise between a
per se approach and a pure negligence approach. Alaska, like many other states, makes
mistake of age a defense to charges of sexual abuse. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445(b) (2006).
But the Alaska statute defining the defense does not just require the defendant to prove that
he or she "reasonably believed" that the victim had reached the critical age. Id. It also
requires him or her to prove that he or she "undertook reasonable measures to verify that the
child was [the critical] age or older." Id.; see also Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith
Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 462-63 (1993)
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IV. HYBRID MENS REA: DEFINING THE ACCEPTABLE RISK
A. DEFINING THE ACCEPTABLE RISK: THE BASIC IDEA
In summary, then, neither the jury nor the legislature is in a position to
make the justifiability calculation in sexual abuse cases. The jury is not
well-equipped to assign a value to the gravity-of-harm factor and, in any
event, cannot really be trusted to put aside what it knows about the victim's
unchastity. The legislature, on the other hand, cannot assign a value to the
probability-of-harm factor in the justifiability calculus, because it cannot
know in advance to what degree the relevant facts will be known to a
particular defendant. Moreover, the legislature's usual way of getting
around this problem-creating a general intent offense whose elements
include knowledge of the circumstances that make the conduct unjustifiably
risky-does not work in the sexual abuse setting, because the facts that
signal the presence or absence of a risk that one's partner is underage are
too various and too subtle.
The answer to this problem is to divide the labor between the
legislature and the jury. Recall that the relationship among the three factors
in the justifiability calculus can be described mathematically: if the
probability of the harm occurring is P, the gravity of the harm is G, and the
social utility of the conduct is U, then conduct is unjustifiable if PG > U or,
to put it slightly differently, if P > U/G.13 6 This means that the legislature,
at least in theory, could calculate the acceptable probability of harm, P,
based on its own assessments of the gravity of the harm, G, that results
(arguing that a defendant who is charged with sexual abuse of a minor, and who raises a
mistake-of-age defense, should be required to prove not only that his belief was reasonable,
but also that he "made reasonable affirmative efforts to learn the true state of circumstances
to comply with the law"). This rule at least has the virtue of suggesting to the jury that the
harm associated with sexual abuse is sufficiently grave to require of the actor more than a
rough visual reckoning of his partner's age. But the reasonable-measures requirement also
suffers from the same basic flaws as the negligence standard, since it requires jurors to
calculate the "reasonable" level of care. These flaws appear to have played out in a recent
Fairbanks, Alaska prosecution where five adult men, ranging in age from nineteen to thirty,
were charged with sexually abusing two girls, ages twelve and thirteen, during a party at the
residence of one of the men. See Dan Rice, 5 Men Acquitted in Sex Abuse Trial, FAIRBANKS
DAILY NEWS-MINER, Nov. 1, 2003, at Al. Three of the defendants relied, at least in part, on
a mistake-of-age defense. Id. The jurors appear to have credited this defense, despite the
fact that the defendants' only "efforts" to verify the girls' ages consisted of listening to the
girls lie. Dan Rice, Arguments Wrap in Sex Abuse Trial, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER,
Oct. 17, 2003, at B1. When the prosecutor asked one of the men why he had not, for
example, "checked the girls' IDs," he answered, "You don't ask for ID in the middle of sex."
Dan Rice, One Defendant Takes the Stand, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Oct. 15, 2003,
at B 1.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
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from sexual abuse and of the social utility, U, of sexual relations. Then the
legislature could delegate to the jury the responsibility for determining
whether, given the circumstances known to the defendant, the probability of
harm actually exceeded this acceptable level. If, for example, the
legislature were to conclude that the gravity of harm, G, from sexual abuse
was ten times greater than the utility, U, of casual sexual intercourse
between persons of indeterminate age, then the legislature would adopt a
statute requiring the jury merely to decide whether the probability, P, of the
defendant's partner being underage was greater than 1/10, or 10%.
The basic point here-that the relationship among the three factors in
the justifiability calculus makes it possible to define the acceptable
probability of harm legislatively-can best be illustrated with an example
from a very different context: standards of proof. Standards of proof
operate much as standards of conduct do. Just as standards of conduct tell.
actors when it is permissible to engage in a particular act, standards of proof
tell triers of fact when it is permissible to return a particular verdict. In a
criminal case, for example, the jury is told not to return a guilty verdict
unless it concludes that the Government has proved all of the elements of
the crime "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 137 This and other standards of
proof, moreover, do exactly what the proposed standard of conduct for
sexual abuse does: they instruct the actor to refrain from action if the
probability that he or she is wrong about a critical fact exceeds a specific,
legislatively (or constitutionally) defined probability threshold.
138
It is easier to understand this feature of standards of proof if one
considers the alternative, which was nicely articulated a few years ago by
Professor Erik Lillquist.139 Lillquist argued that "the standard of proof in
criminal cases should vary from case to case" with the interests at stake.
140
In a capital case, Lillquist said, "a flexible standard of proof should usually
require nearly absolute certainty."1 41 On the other hand, Lillquist said, "in a
case involving someone accused of terrorism and known to be an outspoken
advocate of such actions, the standard of proof will probably be lower than
in other cases, because the risk of harm from an erroneous acquittal is
higher than in other cases."' 142 He also argued that a lower standard was
137 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
"' See, e.g., 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3.5 ("If after a careful and impartial
consideration of all the evidence, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.").
139 Erik Liliquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 85, 146-47 (2002).
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justified in cases involving petty offenses. 143 What Lillquist was proposing
was that standards of proof operate roughly as the negligence and
recklessness standards of conduct do. On his view, the probability at which
"action" would be deemed justifiable should vary with (1) the social utility
of a correct verdict and (2) the gravity of the harm that would accompany
an incorrect verdict. 1
44
Of course, this is not how standards of proof usually operate. Jurors
are not instructed to return a guilty verdict if a guilty verdict is justified.
Rather, they are instructed to return a guilty verdict if the Government's
proof has satisfied a particular fixed probability threshold, that is, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moreover, the probability thresholds reflected in
standards of proof obviously are based on the very kind of calculation the
legislature would conduct in setting the probability threshold for sexual
abuse.' 45 The "preponderance of the evidence" standard is appropriate in
civil actions because the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant are
roughly proportional: any benefit conferred on the plaintiff as a result of a
damages award will be proportional to the cost inflicted on the defendant by
the award. 146  By contrast, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is
appropriate in criminal proceedings because the interests of the state and
the defendant are not proportional. What the defendant stands to lose from
being wrongly imprisoned is vastly disproportionate to the mostly
intangible benefits-for instance, deterrence and general reinforcement of
societal norms-that society hopes to obtain by imprisoning him or her.
147
At least in theory, then, it ought to be possible for the legislature to
perform the same calculation in defining standards of conduct. It ought to
be possible for the legislature to assign values to the gravity-of-harm and
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also C.M.A. McCauliff,
Burdens of Proof" Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1334 (1982) (arguing that the real content of any particular burden of
proof-for example, "reasonable suspicion"-is determined by measuring the dispositions
of a neutral fact-finder who keeps in mind both the government interest in law enforcement
and the suspect's interest in freedom from unreasonable detention-"the practical role of
'reasonable suspicion').
146 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that
"[iln a civil suit between two private parties for money damages,... we view it as no more
serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there
to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiffs favor").
147 See id. at 372 (explaining that "[i]n a criminal case, ... we do not view the social




social utility factors in the justifiability calculus, and to calculate on this
basis the acceptable probability of harm or error.
148
B. THE EXISTING HYBRIDS: KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF
This possibility is more than theoretical. At least two existing criteria
of culpability appear to be based on legislative calculations of the
acceptable level of risk. This is true, first, of the "knowingly" standard.
Under the Model Penal Code, a person is said to act knowingly with respect
to a "result" element if he "is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result. ' 149 In effect, the code's definition of knowingly requires that
the defendant be aware of a very high probability of a bad outcome. Thus,
as Professor Peter Low has put it, the code's definition of knowingly differs
from its definitions of negligently and recklessly in that "the legislature
itself makes the 'objective' judgment."'' 50 The legislature itself assumes the
responsibility for weighing the conduct's social utility and the gravity of the
potential harm, and for determining, on the basis of this weighing, at what
specific level of probability of harm the defendant's conduct is culpable.
The jury is responsible only for deciding whether the defendant was aware
of a risk of this level.
The legislative calculation underlying the adoption of a knowingly
standard is most readily apparent in those statutes where the knowing
mental state defines the boundary between lawful and unlawful conduct.
151
In these statutes, the knowingly standard can plausibly be said to reflect a
legislative determination that the interests at stake justify setting the level of
acceptable risk very high. In other words, it can plausibly be said to reflect
a legislative determination that the social utility of the conduct is high in
relation to the gravity of the potential harm.
148 See Simons, supra note 85, at 287 (commenting that "[t]he law could... explicitly
develop a range of standards: creating a trivial risk of trivial harm requires only slight
justification; creating a more significant risk of a trivial harm requires a more weighty
justification; creating a significant risk of more significant harm requires an even more
weighty justification; and so forth").
149 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (1985).
150 Low, supra note 30, at 552; see also Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-
Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 601, 644 (explaining that knowledge is "not gauged
according to the normative expectations of others").
151 Often the knowingly standard is used, not to define the boundary between innocent
and unlawful conduct, but rather to define the boundary between one offense and another,
more serious offense. This is the case, for example, in the Model Penal Code's homicide
provisions, which use the knowingly standard (along with other standards) to separate
murder from manslaughter. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 210.2.
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Consider, for example, the federal statute prohibiting so-called partial-
birth abortion.152 A partial-birth abortion, as defined by the statute, is one
in which the doctor partly delivers an intact, living fetus before dispatching
it.153 In Gonzales v. Carhart,154 the Supreme Court interpreted this statute
to impose a culpability standard of knowingly with respect to the critical
fact. 155 That is, a doctor can be convicted under the statute only if, at the
very least, he or she was aware that the delivery of an intact, living fetus
was "practically certain to follow" from her conduct.1 56 The statute, then,
establishes a very high, fixed probability threshold at which the risk of an
intact delivery is unacceptable.
This high threshold is justified by the interests at stake, as the Court
recognized. 157  The usual second-trimester abortion procedure-intact
dilation and extraction-unavoidably will result in the partial delivery of a
living fetus in "a significant number of cases."' 58 Thus, if the risk threshold
were set any lower-or were set on a case-by-case basis by jurors charged
with balancing the relevant interests-doctors might be discouraged from
performing a standard abortion procedure that has very substantial social
utility. What is more, the "harm" that is the target of the partial-birth
abortion statute is intangible at best.'59 Thus, it makes sense that Congress
would have concluded that the social utility of an abortion outweighs the
potential harm except in those cases where the doctor is practically certain
that his or her conduct will result in a partial-birth abortion.
1 60
152 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
153 Id.
' 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
115 Id. at 1632.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1631.
158 Id.; see also Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1998) (striking
down Wisconsin statute prohibiting partial-birth abortion in part because that statute would
make doctors afraid to perform permissible abortion procedures).
9 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1633-34 (describing the interest the statute is designed to
protect); see also Eric A. Johnson, Habit and Discernment in Abortion Practice: The
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as Morals Legislation, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 587
(2005) (arguing that prohibition on partial-birth abortion is justified (if at all) only by
society's interest in cultivating in physicians a general habit of refraining from violence to
persons).
160 Other cases, too, suggest that legislatures choose knowingly as the culpability
baseline in just those situations where the gravity of the harm is relatively slight or the
statute threatens to affect conduct that has substantial social utility. See Lee v. Smith, 772
P.2d 82, 87 (Colo. 1989) (interpreting drug-paraphernalia statute to require "aware[ness] that
the paraphernalia 'is practically certain' to be put to an illegal use in connection with a
controlled substance"); Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 462 A.2d 573, 587 (N.J. 1983)
(interpreting drug-paraphernalia statute to require proof that the defendant was "practically
certain" that the item would used for illegal purposes"); Gregory W. O'Reilly, Illinois'
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The same sort of calculus is at work in statutes where the legislature
uses "belief' to define the culpability baseline. The Model Penal Code's
self-defense provisions, for example, provide that a person is justified in
using deadly force only if she believes that deadly force is immediately
necessary to protect herself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping,
or rape.16 1 This requirement of actual belief makes the defense unavailable
to a person who merely suspects that deadly force will prove necessary to
protect herself, or who merely has a hunch that deadly force will prove
necessary. In other words, it makes the defense unavailable to a person
who estimates the probability that deadly force will prove necessary at
something less than 50%.162 After all, a person who estimates the
likelihood of a fact's existence at less than 50% cannot really be said to
believe in that fact.
163
Of course, a requirement of belief is rarely used in isolation. More
often, legislatures define the culpability threshold using the more complex
notion of "reasonable belief." This is true, for example, of most state
statutes defining the defense of self-defense, which make the defense
available only to actors who "reasonably believe" that force is necessary.
1 64
It also is true of the Model Penal Code provision defining the mistake-of-
age defense to child sexual abuse.1 65 This provision affords the defense to
anyone who reasonably believes that his or her partner has reached the
critical age. 166  In these provisions, the effect of the reasonable belief
standard is to impose liability if either (1) the defendant did not believe in
the existence of the critical fact, that is, did not assign a probability greater
than 50% to its existence or (2) a "reasonable person" who knew just what
the defendant knew would not have believed in the existence of the critical
Stalking Statute: Taking Unsteady Aim at Preventing Attacks, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 821,
829-30 (1993) (explaining that Illinois's statute defining the offense of felony stalking, 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.3(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2007), requires the Government to prove that
the defendant was "practically certain" that his public movements would place the victim in
fear of injury).
161 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.04(1), (2)(b) (1985).
162 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 509-11. This relationship between belief and
probability is nicely illustrated by cases applying the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. See, e.g., Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940)
(explaining that a proposition "is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if it is made to
appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the
evidence, exists in the mind.., of the tribunal not withstanding any doubts that may linger
there").
163 Simons, supra note 15, at 187 (arguing that it would be incoherent to suppose both
that a person believes X and is aware of a probability greater than fifty percent that not X).
164 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4(c), at 147 (2d ed. 2003).
165 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.6(1).
166 -
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fact, that is, would not have assigned a probability greater than 50% to its
existence.
It is tempting to suppose that with the addition of this reasonable
person component, the belief standard devolves into a simple negligence
standard. This is what the authors of the Model Penal Code commentary
appear to have assumed, for example. In the commentary on the section
defining the mistake-of-age defense, they said that the "reasonable belief'
defense in this section "in effect ... imposes a culpability standard of
negligence.' ' 167 But this assumption is wrong. Even with the addition of a
reasonable person component, the belief standard retains its hybrid
character; it continues to define a fixed probability threshold at which the
risk of a bad outcome is unjustifiable.
168
Here is why. Under a negligence standard, fault can arise at either of
two stages of the decision-making process: (1) the information-gathering,
probability-estimating stage or (2) the information-using stage, at which the
defendant evaluates the various courses of action on the basis of his or her
probability estimates. 169 To illustrate, imagine a man who is considering
engaging in sexual relations with a young woman. After meeting the young
woman at a party and returning with her to his apartment, he estimates at
70% the probability that she has reached the critical age of, say, sixteen.
On the basis of this probability estimate, he decides to engage in sexual
intercourse with her. Under a negligence standard, a jury plausibly could
find fault in the process by which he arrived at the 70% estimate; perhaps
he ignored some clear sign that his partner was underage, or perhaps he
ignored an obvious avenue for obtaining additional information. But the
jury also could find fault in his decision to act on this probability estimate,
however carefully formulated. The jury could conclude that a 30% chance
of being wrong is just too high in this setting, given the interests at stake.
The reasonable belief standard takes the second of these two questions
out of the jury's hands. In common parlance, the reasonableness of a belief
depends on whether the actor exercised due care in forming the belief.
170
But the reasonableness of a belief does not depend on whether the belief is
sufficient in degree of certainty to justify action under the circumstances in
167 Id. § 213.6 cmt. 2 at 413.
168 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 518-21.
169 See ELLERY EELLS, RATIONAL DECISION AND CAUSALITY 5 (1982) (observing that
"decision making involves two processes: (i) obtaining a body of relevant information (the
process of information-acquisition) and (ii) evaluating the available courses of action in
terms of the information at hand (the process of deliberation, or of information-use)").
170 Johnson, supra note 6, at 516-18; see also MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES
§ 1.13(16) (providing that "'reasonably believes' or 'reasonable belief designates a belief
which the actor is not reckless or negligent in holding").
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which the actor finds himself or herself.171 If, for example, a friend who
had just decided to walk around a glacial crevasse instead of jumping over
it were to tell us that she nevertheless believed that she could have jumped
the crevasse if she'd tried, we would probably not be inclined to
characterize her belief as unreasonable just because it was insufficient in
degree of certainty to justify action under the circumstances in which she
found herself. Just so for the defendant in our hypothetical case: his belief
that his partner had reached the critical age was not unreasonable merely by
virtue of the fact that it was insufficient in degree of certainty to justify
action under the circumstances in which he found himself. This
insufficiency makes his actions unreasonable, not his beliefs.1
72
What this means, in substance, is that a reasonable belief standard-
like an unadorned belief standard-represents an antecedent legislative
determination that the risk posed by the defendant's conduct is unjustifiable
per se if the probability of a bad outcome exceeds 50%. This legislative
determination operates to exculpate the defendant if (1) the defendant
assigned a probability less than 50% to the chance of a bad outcome and (2)
a reasonable person who knew only what the defendant knew would have
assigned a probability less than 50% to the chance of a bad outcome. And
so this legislative determination relieves the jury of the responsibility of
deciding at what level of probability the actor would have been justified in
acting.
This account of the reasonable belief standard probably explains why
state legislatures so frequently have adopted this standard as the culpability
baseline for self-defense. 173 The costs of mistakenly using force in self-
defense will always be roughly proportional to the costs of mistakenly
refraining from the use of force in self-defense. In terms of costs and
benefits, an injury inflicted on an innocent aggressor is no worse and no
better than an injury to an innocent defender. Given this rough
proportionality-between (1) the gravity of the harm that the actor hopes to
avoid by his or her conduct and (2) the gravity of the harm of that would
result from a mistake-it makes sense to conclude, as the drafters of the
Model Penal Code evidently did, that the use of force will always be
justifiable at a probability of 50% or so. That is, the use of force will
always be justifiable if the actor estimated at greater than 50% the
likelihood that force was necessary; if, in common parlance, the actor
"believed" that force was necessary.
171 Johnson, supra note 6, at 518-21.
172 Brian Carr, Knowledge and Its Risks, 82 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 115, 124 (1982)
(acknowledging the existence of a distinction between rational action and rational belief).
173 See LAFAVE, supra note 164, § 10.4(c), at 147.
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C. WHY SEXUAL ABUSE LENDS ITSELF TO LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION
OF THE ACCEPTABLE RISK
Some crimes would not lend themselves to antecedent legislative
calculation of the acceptable risk. This is true, for example, of reckless
manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The statutes that define
these offenses apply to a wide array of different kinds of conduct, each of
which carries its own costs and benefits. For this reason, it would not be
possible to replace the prohibition on criminally negligent homicide with a
prohibition on conduct that creates, for example, a 5% risk of causing
another person's death. 
17 4
In contrast to crimes like criminally negligent homicide, sexual abuse
plainly lends itself to a legislative definition of the acceptable risk. The
legislature is perfectly capable of assigning a value to the social utility of
sexual conduct in advance, since this value will vary only within a narrow
range. The only real benefits of sexual intercourse lie in the pleasure and
intimacy it affords to the participants. Sexual intercourse does not carry
substantial educational benefits for the participants,"' nor does it carry
substantial medical benefits for them, 176 despite occasional arguments to the
contrary by criminal defendants. Where sexual abuse is concerned, then, it
is not beyond the legislature's competence to assign a uniform social utility
value that can fairly be applied to every case in which the defendant is
charged with sexual abuse.
177
174 See Simons, supra note 85, at 320 (arguing that "[olne cannot, for example, simply
define negligent homicide as a killing in which the actor should have realized that he created
a 2%, or 5%, risk of unjustifiably causing a death").
175 See, e.g., United States v. Chee, 86 F. App'x 400, 402 (10th Cir. 2004) (recounting
defendant's testimony at his trial for sexual abuse of six-year-old girl that "he did these
things ... not for any sexual gratification but because he wanted to teach her about the birds
and the bees"); State v. Stricklin, No. M2005-02911-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1028535, at *4
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2007) (recounting defendant's testimony at his trial for rape and
aggravated sexual battery that he had touched the two minor victims on their breasts and
genitals "as part of his teaching the victims about sexual matters").
176 See Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing
rape conviction of defendant who had persuaded victim to consent to sexual intercourse by
telling her falsely that sexual intercourse with him was necessary to cure her of a potentially
fatal disease).
177 Cf Commonwealth v. Dunne, 474 N.E.2d 538, 545 (Mass. 1985) (arguing that "[the
person] who contemplates intercourse with a partner of indeterminate age can resolve doubts
in favor of compliance with the law without sacrificing behavior that society considers
desirable" (quoting Recent Case, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1257, 1259 (1965)); Wasserstrom, supra
note 18, at 737 n.24 (observing that there do not "appear to be any very serious undesirable
consequences in discouraging persons from having intercourse with females who may be
around the age of sixteen"))).
2009]
ERIC A. JOHNSON
The same thing is true, moreover, of the other factor that plays a role
in the calculation of the acceptable risk-the gravity of the potential harm
to the victim. The effects of sexual abuse vary from victim to victim,178 but
it is not the case-specific effects of the abuse that matter. This factor in the
justifiability calculus is, like the others, considered from an ex ante
perspective, rather than an ex post perspective.179 Accordingly, the relevant
question is not what the effects of the sexual abuse on any specific victim
happen to have been, but rather what sort of harm can be expected to
accompany sexual abuse of the kind perpetrated by the defendant. The
legislature is in a better position than a trial jury to answer this question. A
jury will not, and probably should not, hear general testimony at trial about
the effects of sexual abuse. Only the legislature, "with its paraphernalia of
committee and commission," really has the ability to hear the testimony and
make the findings necessary for the required valuation.
180
In sexual abuse cases, then, the legislature is in a better position than
the jury to assign appropriate values to the social utility of defendants'
conduct and the gravity of the potential harm. It is only the last of the three
factors in the justifiability calculation-the degree of probability of harm
that was or should have been apparent to the defendant under the
circumstances-that lies beyond the legislature's ken. This is why the
legislature, under a hybrid standard, would delegate to the jury the
responsibility for making this determination. The jury would have the
opportunity to view and listen to the victim, as well as to hear evidence of
the contextual facts that were known to the defendant.
D. CALCULATING THE ACCEPTABLE RISK
Neither of the existing hybrids-neither the knowingly standard nor
the reasonable belief standard-would likely be of any use to a state
legislature in defining the acceptable risk in sexual abuse cases. The
knowingly standard establishes a very high probability threshold under
which the risk is justifiable unless the defendant's conduct is "practically
certain" to cause the proscribed social harm. 181 This standard is appropriate
178 KINNEAR, supra note 127, at 35 (noting that "the effects of child sexual abuse are
characterized by great variation and range" (quoting ELIZABETH HOLLENBERG & CYNTHIA
RAGAN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: SELECTED PROJECTS 179 (1991))).
179 See Peter Z. Grossman, Reed W. Cearley & Daniel H. Cole, Uncertainty, Insurance
and the Learned Hand Formula, 5 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 2 (2006) (positing that
Learned Hand formula would require the fact-finder to assess the magnitude of the expected
harm from an ex ante perspective).
180 Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REv. 495,
508 (1908).
181 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(b) (1985).
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as a culpability baseline where the utility factor in the justifiability calculus
is very high in relation to the gravity-of-harm factor, as it is for, say, a
medical procedure like partial-birth abortion. The other hybrid standard-
belief or reasonable belief-also establishes a relatively high probability
threshold. In self-defense, for example, the effect of this standard is to
make the defense unavailable to an actor who is aware of a probability
greater than 50% that his or her use of force is unnecessary. This threshold
is appropriate in self-defense because the utility and gravity-of-harm factors
are roughly in equipoise; the defender's life is worth as much as the
aggressor' s.182
The acceptable risk of sexual imposition is probably far lower, given
the limited social utility of sexual intercourse-at least in the kinds of
settings where mistakes of age occur-and given, too, the gravity of the
harm that accompanies sexual abuse. Mistakes of age rarely will occur in
settings where the sexual conduct "is but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring."' 8 3  After all, the development of an enduring
personal bond is likely to provide each partner with ample opportunity for
learning the other's age. 184 In the relevant class of cases, then, the benefit at
stake is limited to the momentary gratification of the sex act itself.
Accordingly, legislatures charged with defining the acceptable level of risk
in sexual abuse are likely to conclude, as courts and commentators have,
that "[the person] who contemplates intercourse with a partner of
indeterminate age can resolve doubts in favor of compliance with the law
without sacrificing behavior that society considers desirable."
'1 85
182 Unfortunately, legislatures and courts often have used the reasonable belief standard
in defining the acceptable risk of sexual imposition, despite its obvious inaptness. See, e.g.,
State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 (Alaska 1978); People v. Hemandez, 393 P.2d 673, 676
(Cal. 1964); see also ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN
CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: IPI CRIMINAL § 11.64 (4th ed.
2000) (instructing jury that it is a defense to statutory rape that the defendant reasonably
believed the victim had reached the critical age); MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES
§ 213.6(1) (making it a defense to charge of statutory rape that the defendant "reasonably
believed the child to be above the critical age").
183 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
184 Cf Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 599, 662 (2005) (arguing that a statute criminalizing unprotected sex between first-time
partners would not affect the privacy interests protected by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, because
"[i]t does not impose any kind of regulation on an on-going intimate relationship .... The
sexual liberties that are constitutionally protected from state interference ... are simply not
implicated by a statute that only affects first-time sexual encounters").
185 Commonwealth v. Dunne, 474 N.E.2d 538, 545 (Mass. 1985) (quoting Recent Case,
supra note 177, at 1259); Wasserstrom, supra note 18, at 737 n.24 (observing that there do
not "appear to be any very serious undesirable consequences in discouraging persons from
having intercourse with females who may be around the age of sixteen").
2009]
ERIC A. JOHNSON
The other side of the balance is the harm that accompanies sexual
abuse. The adverse short- and long-term effects of sexual abuse on the
victim are fairly well-documented at this point-hostility, anxiety, low self-
esteem, vulnerability to re-victimization, feelings of isolation, sexual
maladjustment, and substance abuse. 8 6  But these short- and long-term
effects are also largely beside the point. If scientists were to demonstrate
that victims of, say, aggravated battery or armed robbery were unlikely to
suffer any measurable long-term harm from the offense-or even that the
victims of these crimes were likely to be happier in the long run than
persons who were not victimized-nobody would be inclined on this basis
to legalize aggravated battery or armed robbery.'8 7  This holds true for
sexual abuse as well. Most sexual abuse statutes are designed to identify
the point at which the youth of the victim and the discrepancy in age
between the victim and the perpetrator combine to make the sex coercive.
188
Coercion in the disposition of sexual favors would appear to be a
cognizable harm quite apart from the short- and long-term effects on the
victim.
This Article does not attempt to resolve this question definitively.
What matters, for our purposes, is only this: judicial and legislative
decisions imposing strict liability for sexual abuse appear to be grounded, at
least in part, on the not-implausible view that the harm wrought by sexual
abuse is disproportionate to the social utility of casual sex with teenagers.
189
So if we are to construct a viable alternative to strict liability-if, that is, we
are to construct a mens rea requirement that will prove satisfactory to courts
186 See DIANE DEPANFILIS, LITERATURE REVIEW OF SEXUAL ABUSE 10-12 (1986);
KINNEAR, supra note 127, at 14-20; Angela Browne & David Finkelhor, Initial and Long-
Term Effects: A Review of the Research, in A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 143
(David Finkelhor ed., 1986); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 396-98 (1992)
(arguing that, despite methodological difficulties, "the heavy preponderance of studies which
find that the sexual abuse of children leaves deep and lasting scars makes a cumulatively
convincing case").
187 See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 152-53 (2007) (summarizing recent
"studies of those who survive major traumas suggest[ing] that the vast majority do quite
well, and that a significant portion claim that their lives were enhanced by the experience").
188 See Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and
the Potential for Using the Master's Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL
L. REV. 799, 810 (2001) (explaining that the "underlying theory" behind sexual abuse
statutes that assign significance to the discrepancy in age between victim and perpetrator is
"that a young person is more vulnerable to coercion when their sexual partner is
considerably older"); Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v. Simmons:
"Kids Are Just Different" and "Kids Are Like Adults" Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 273, 296 (2008) ("The basic legal theory behind statutory rape
is ... that youths cannot give the appropriate consent due to the inherent power difference
that comes from the age difference.").
189 See Dunne, 474 N.E.2d at 545.
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and legislatures that currently impose strict liability-then we must
calculate the acceptable risk on the basis of the same assumptions. This
means setting the acceptable risk low. If, for example, the gravity-of-harm
factor in the justifiability calculus were to be assigned a value ten times
greater than the social utility factor, then the acceptable probability of one's
partner being underage would be just 10%.
Of course, using a numerical probability figure in instructing the jury
would probably not be advisable. A better alternative would be to instruct
the jury using an ordinary-language equivalent. If, for example, the
legislature were to determine that the acceptable level of probability was
10%, then the jury might be instructed that the Government was required to
prove that the defendant was or should have been aware of a "realistic
possibility" that the victim was underage. This formula is of a piece with
the "practical certainty" formula that is used to define the acceptable risk
where knowingly is the mens rea.190
It also is of a piece with formulae used by legislatures outside the
criminal setting to define a low, fixed threshold of acceptable risk. For
example, some state statutes require public officials to refrain from
accepting a campaign contribution if there is any "substantial possibility"
that it is being offered to influence the official.1 91  Similar threshold-
defining formulae also are sometimes used in laws protecting the
environment and public health. 92  For example, the Food Quality
190 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(b) (1985).
191 See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-10-3(7) (West 2003) (providing that a member of a state
board or commission shall "[n]ever accept any economic opportunity under circumstances
where he knows or should know that there is a substantial possibility that the opportunity is
being afforded him with intent to influence his conduct in the performance of his official
duties"); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 420/3-102 (2006) (prohibiting state legislator from accepting
an economic opportunity "where he knows or should know that there is a substantial
possibility that the opportunity is being afforded him with intent to influence his conduct in
the performance of his official duties"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1014(I)(E) (1989)
(defining "conflict of interest" to include any situation "where the Legislator knows that
there is a substantial possibility that an opportunity for employment is being afforded him or
a member of his immediate family with intent to influence his conduct in the performance of
his official duties").
192 See Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64
MD. L. REV. 159, 180-81 (2005). The "safety-based" approach to risk regulation establishes
a fixed, sometimes numerical, level of permissible risk. ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., TORT
AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1237 (4th ed. 2004). Under this approach, the
regulator is responsible solely for assessing the probability that harm will come to pass, not
for deciding at what level the risk is "feasible" or "cost-justified." Id. at 1237; see also Alon
Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 275 (1992) (explaining that legislators often adopt "mandated numerical




Protection Act of 1996193 effectively requires the Environmental Protection
Agency to reduce pesticide chemical residues on food to the point where
"there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate
exposure to the pesticide chemical residue."' 194 In this setting, as in other
environmental settings, defining legislatively the acceptable level of risk
"better guarantee[s] that an appropriate degree of protection is provided to
the public."'195 Just so in sexual abuse.
Finally, the realistic possibility formula is consistent with formulae
used by the Model Penal Code to define secondary mental states for some
offenses. The Code section defining the offense of "misapplication of
entrusted property," for example, is satisfied when a fiduciary disposes of
property entrusted to him "in a manner which he knows is unlawful and
involves a substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the property
or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. 1 96 Thus, the
offense has two mental elements: the actor must be aware that his or her
conduct is unlawful and must, in addition, be aware "of a substantial risk of
loss or detriment to the beneficial owner of the property."'197 This second
mental element, which the Code commentary describes as "the gravamen of
19 21 U.S.C § 346a(b)(2) (2006).
194 The Act provides that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), as a general rule, may establish or leave in place a tolerance for pesticide residue on
food only if the tolerance is "safe." Id. § 346a(b)(2). A tolerance will qualify as "safe" only
if "the Administrator has determined that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will
result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue." Id. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii).
The 1996 Act was a departure from the cost-justified approach to pesticide residues that had
prevailed until 1996. Until 1996, the Administrator establishing tolerances for pesticide
residue was required to consider, among other things, "the necessity for production of an
adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply" and the "usefulness" of the pesticide.
See former 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(1) (amended 1996).
195 Rosenthal et al., supra note 192, at 275. This approach to risk regulation is also
illustrated by aspects of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. See Pub. L. No. 101-
549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). The 1990 amendments' approach to air pollution was primarily
technology-based; they required application of the best available technology for the
reduction of emissions. Rosenthal et al., supra note 192, at 324. But the amendments also
required the Administrator of the EPA to take additional action if, after six years,
technology-based regulations had failed adequately to reduce the risk from known, probable,
or possible human carcinogens. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2000); 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.03[15][c] (2008); Keating, supra note 192, at 182. Specifically,
the administrator would be required to take action if the existing regulations had not
"reduce[d] lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to emissions.., to
less than one in one million." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A). This aspect of the amendments,
then, establishes a fixed, numerically-defined level of acceptable risk from carcinogens. The
acceptable level of risk is one in one million, regardless of cost or feasibility.
196 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 224.13 (1985).
19' Id. § 224.13 cmt. at 361.
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the offense,"198 appears to define an invariant, low risk threshold, just as the
realistic possibility standard does.1 99
Nor is this the only setting where the Model Penal Code appears to
contemplate that juries will apply a low, invariant threshold of risk. Recall
that the Model Penal Code requires that some culpable mental state be
proved with respect to every material element of an offense, regardless of
whether the element makes the conduct criminal or just makes it a more
serious offense. 200  This means that the Government sometimes will be
required to prove that the defendant was negligent or reckless with regard to
an aggravating circumstance, such as the fact that the value of the property
stolen was more than $1,000,01 or the fact that the drug sale occurred
within 1,000 feet of a public school.20 2 In this setting, however, it does not
make sense to talk about the "justifiability" of the risk. Theft is
unjustifiable quite apart from the value of the property, and drug-dealing is
unjustifiable quite apart from whether it occurs within 1,000 feet of a public
school. Accordingly, when the jury sets out to determine whether the
defendant was negligent or reckless with regard to one of these aggravating
facts, the question it addresses will just be whether the defendant was or
should have been aware of a "substantial risk., 20 3 This substantial risk
requirement presumably operates just as the requirement of a realistic
possibility would.204
V. THE SEPARATE QUESTION OF CULPABILITY
The mens rea I have proposed-which would require proof that the
defendant was or should have been aware of a realistic possibility that his
partner was underage-does more than define the acceptable risk. It also
198 Id. at 362.
199 See Fredette v. City of Long Beach, 231 Cal. Rptr. 598, 602 n.5 (Cal, Ct. App. 1986)
(interpreting statutory reference to "substantial risk" to reflect legislative concern "'not with
the extent of the injury, but with the probability that an injury would occur'); Robinson,
supra note 32, at 375 (arguing that this formulation "leave[s] out of the prohibited-risk
analysis consideration of most of the factors that the Code drafters themselves seem to agree
are relevant [to justifiability]" and "might be taken to focus only on the degree of the risk");
Simons, supra note 15, at 189-92 (arguing that the better view is that the "substantiality" of a
risk depends exclusively on the probability of a bad outcome occurring).
200 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(1).
201 Id. § 223.1 cmt. at 144 (explaining that "the culpability provisions of Section 2.02 are
fully applicable to the values used to differentiate the degrees of theft").
202 See State v. Rutley, 123 P.3d 334, 337-38 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that proof
of some culpable mental state is necessary with respect to the statutory requirement that drug
sales occur within 1,000 feet of a school), rev'd, 171 P.3d 361 (Or. 2007).
203 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c), (d).
204 See sources cited supra note 35.
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defines the circumstances under which a defendant will be deemed culpable
for creating an unacceptable risk. The question of culpability, though, is
distinct from the question of justifiability. In this Part, I will try to answer
this question by showing how the new mens rea is related, first, to the
culpability component of recklessness and criminal negligence and, second,
to the knowingly and reasonable belief standards.
A. CULPABILITY IN RECKLESSNESS AND NEGLIGENCE
I said before that the idea of unjustifiable risk lies at the core of the
recklessness and criminal negligence standards. 0 5  But the baseline
requirement of unjustifiability does not, of course, exhaust the content of
these standards. As the Model Penal Code commentary explains, the
assessment of the risk is just the first of the jury's "two distinct functions"
in applying the definitions of recklessness and criminal negligence.2 °6 Both
standards require the jury to perform a second function too. The
recklessness standard requires the jury "to make [a] culpability judgment in
terns of whether the defendant's conscious disregard of the risk justifies
condemnation., 20 7  The negligence standard likewise requires the jury to
make a separate "culpability judgment, this time in terms of whether the
failure of the defendant to perceive the risk justifies condemnation. 20 8
It may be unclear at first what this second step adds to the analysis, at
least with respect to negligence. After all, the jury takes the defendant's
perspective into account when it performs the basic justifiability
calculation; the justifiability of the risk, again, is calculated on the basis of
the "circumstances known to [the defendant]. 20 9  Moreover, the basic
justifiability calculation makes allowances for actors whose conduct falls
close to the edge. By requiring a "gross deviation" from the standard of
care, the negligence and recklessness standards seem to build a margin of
latitude into the justifiability calculation itself.210 Why is anything more
required for the imposition of criminal liability?
205 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
206 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 238, 241.
207 Id. at 238.
208 Id. at 241.
209 Id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d); see also Simons, supra note 85, at 299 (acknowledging that "the
ex ante perspective that is normally a necessary feature of the tort negligence judgment itself
presupposes a certain kind of 'cognitive' [negligence]").
210 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(c) (defining "recklessly" to require
"a gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe");
§ 2.02(2)(d) (defining "negligently" to require "a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe"); see also Dressier, supra note 21, at 958 (arguing
that recklessness "exists when one takes a substantially unjustified-or, if you wish, grossly
unjustified-risk").
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The answer is that culpability cannot be assigned merely on the basis
of the defendant's awareness of the circumstances that make the conduct
unjustifiably risky. To illustrate, suppose that Bill engages in sexual
intercourse with Violet after meeting her at a fraternity party. At the party,
Bill and Violet have a lengthy and wide-ranging conversation during which
Bill learns (1) that Violet's mother died tragically at the age of thirty on
September 11, 2001, in the attack on the World Trade Center, (2) that
Violet's sister, Katherine, was born when their mother was just fifteen, and
(3) that Violet is ten years younger than her sister Katherine. On the basis
of the circumstances known to Bill before he had sex with Violet, the jury
would have to conclude that the probability of Violet being underage was
100%. (Violet's sister was born around 1986 and so Violet herself was
born around 1996, which makes her about thirteen years old.) This 100%
risk of Violet being underage is not only unjustifiable, but also grossly
unjustifiable. At the same time, though, if these were the only facts
available to Bill-if, for instance, Bill is visually impaired and so could not
see Violet-a question remains as to whether Bill's actions deserve
condemnation. In the words of the Model Penal Code commentary, Bill's
unjustifiable conduct might really be attributable to an innocent
"intellectual failure to grasp" the significance of known facts, rather than to
a culpable "insensitivity to the interests of others."21'
The jury's second distinct function in its application of the negligence
and recklessness standards is to make this determination whether the
defendant's actions deserve condemnation. Even after the jury determines
on the basis of facts known to the defendant that the risk posed by his or her
conduct was unjustifiable, the jury still must determine whether the conduct
was attributable to an innocent intellectual failure to grasp the significance
of known facts or instead was attributable to a culpable insensitivity to the
interests of others.21 2 This second determination is necessary because
sometimes even purely deductive inferences from known facts-like those
that Bill failed to draw-are less than obvious, and so sometimes the
defendant's failure to realize that his or her conduct is unjustifiable is less
than culpable. This is obviously true of negligence, where the defendant's
fault lies in failing to perceive the risk. But it is also true of recklessness,
where the jury makes a threshold determination that the defendant was
actually aware of some level of risk.21 3 Even a defendant who is aware of
some level of risk might be less than culpable in failing to realize that the
211 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 237.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 236 (identifying awareness of risk as component of recklessness); see also
Simons, supra note 85, at 290 (noting that "the only difference between negligence and
recklessness under the Code is this difference in awareness").
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probability of harm is high enough to make his or her conduct
unjustifiable.214
B. CULPABILITY IN HYBRID FORMS: AWARENESS OF RISK EXCEEDING
A LEGISLATIVELY DEFINED THRESHOLD
Hybrid criteria of culpability-like the knowingly and reasonable
belief criteria, and like my proposed realistic possibility criterion-take a
different approach to the question of culpability. These hybrid criteria
provide two separate avenues for assigning culpability. First, a defendant is
culpable per se if he or she actually is aware that the probability of harm
exceeds the legislatively defined justifiability threshold.215 Second, a
defendant is culpable if a jury later decides that he or she deserves
condemnation for failing to recognize that the risk exceeded this
threshold.216  This subpart addresses the first of these two avenues for
assigning culpability.
Both the knowingly and the reasonable belief standards are satisfied by
proof that the defendant actually was aware of a probability of harm
exceeding the legislatively defined threshold. The knowingly standard is
satisfied where the actor actually is "aware that it is practically certain that
his conduct will cause [the proscribed] result., 217 And the reasonable belief
standard is satisfied where the actor actually is aware of a risk that exceeds
the fixed probability threshold of roughly 50%. In a self-defense case, for
example, if the defendant is aware of a probability greater than 50% that
force is unnecessary, then he or she cannot believe that force is
necessary. 21 8  Bear in mind, this actual awareness determination differs
from the base determination of unjustifiability. The base determination of
unjustifiability requires only that the defendant be aware of circumstances
from which a certain probability of harm may logically be inferred. Actual
awareness requires additionally that the defendant actually has drawn the
inference and is thus aware of a probability of harm exceeding the
legislatively defined threshold.
214 See Batey, supra note 35, at 405-06 (observing that an actor's awareness of risk
satisfies the requirement of conscious disregard, even where an actor believes that
probability of harm is not sufficiently high to make conduct unjustifiable); Simons, supra
note 15, at 189 (arguing that "it is fairly clear from the [Model Penal Code] commentary
(though not from the text) that the defendant needs to be aware only that the risk is
substantial, not that it is unjustifiable").
215 See infra text accompanying notes 217-18.
216 See infra text accompanying notes 224-25.
217 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
218 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 517-18.
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This is a powerful guarantee of culpability-more powerful than the
guarantees afforded by the criminal negligence and reckless standards.
Where a defendant actually is aware that the probability of harm exceeds
the level at which it is justifiable, not just aware of the underlying facts that
make his or her conduct unjustifiable, the defendant cannot plausibly claim
that the wrongdoing is attributable to an innocent "intellectual failure to
grasp" the significance of known facts.219 The decision to act in the face of
this known risk can only be attributable to a culpable "insensitivity to the
interests of others., 220  Actual awareness of a risk exceeding the
legislatively defined justifiability threshold also provides a more powerful
guarantee of culpability than does general intent. General intent offenses
ordinarily require the Government only to prove that the defendant was
aware of the underlying facts that make his or her conduct unjustifiable, for
example, that he or she is driving and that he or she has consumed
intoxicants. 221 The hybrid criteria go further in requiring that the defendant
actually realize to what degree these facts make the conduct risky.
Moreover, actual awareness of a probability exceeding the
legislatively defined threshold ought to suffice for culpability regardless of
how high or how low the legislature fixes the threshold. After all, there is
not anything inherently more culpable about awareness of, say, a "practical
certainty" than there is about awareness of a "realistic possibility." It all
depends on what is at stake---on the gravity of the potential harm and the
219 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 237.
220 Id.
221 Crimes like drunk-driving homicide and drug-induced homicide require no more by
way of culpability than knowledge of the facts that make the conduct dangerous. See, e.g.,
State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 565 (Fla. 1999). In this setting, a defendant's assertion
that her actions did not "justify] condemnation" despite her knowledge of the relevant facts
would essentially take the form of a mistake-of-law defense. MODEL PENAL CODE &
COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 238. After all, the legislature already has determined that the
conduct in question is unjustifiably risky per se and, in reliance on that determination, has
announced a specific prohibition on the conduct. To viably claim that his or her decision to
engage in this conduct was not culpable, the defendant would have to assert, among other
things, that he or she was unaware of this specific prohibition. But it is settled that
ignorance of the law is not an excuse, even when the offense in question is malum
prohibitum rather than malum in se. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (N.Y.
1987) (upholding defendant's conviction under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 for possession of
an unlicensed, loaded pistol); see also United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147 n.3 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that mens rea "does not demand knowledge of guilt in the sense of
knowledge of the law that makes conduct illegal, but rather only knowledge of the facts that
make the conduct illegal"); MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02(9) (providing that
"neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an
offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of




utility of the conduct.222 What makes the defendant's awareness of a
practical certainty culpable in a case where knowingly defines the criterion
of culpability is the fact that the defendant is aware of a risk greater than
what is justifiable. 3 And the same is true regardless of how high or low
the legislature defines the acceptable risk. Thus, if the legislature concludes
that an actor is not justified in accepting even a realistic possibility that his
or her partner is underage, then actual awareness of such a possibility ought
to suffice for culpability.
C. CULPABILITY IN HYBRID FORMS: CULPABLY FAILING TO BE
AWARE OF A RISK EXCEEDING THE LEGISLATIVELY DEFINED
THRESHOLD
For much the same reason, it should also be enough for the
Government to prove that the defendant should have been aware of a
realistic possibility that his or her partner was underage. When the
knowingly standard or the reasonable belief standard defines the culpability
baseline, it is enough for the Government to prove that the defendant was
culpable in failing to be aware of a probability of harm exceeding the
defined threshold. Thus, the knowingly standard is satisfied by proof of
"willful blindness," that is, by proof that the defendant "ha[d] his suspicion
aroused but then deliberately omit[ted] to make further inquiries, because
he wishe[d] to remain in ignorance. 224 Probably more to the point, the
reasonable belief criterion of culpability is satisfied when a reasonable
person in the defendant's place would not have "believed" in the existence
of the critical fact. 225  This means that the criterion is satisfied when a
reasonable person in the defendant's place would have been aware of a
222 See Alexander, supra note 32, at 940-41 (arguing that "[s]eeing knowledge just as a
species of recklessness" is helpful, in part, because "it allows us to avoid the error of
deeming all cases of knowledge to be more culpable than all cases of recklessness, even
where the harm risked is the same").
223 Id.
224 WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 57, at 157, quoted in United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697,
700 (9th Cir. 1976). The willful blindness doctrine, as traditionally conceived, is more
demanding than, say, a requirement that a reasonable person would have been aware of a
"practical certainty" of the result occurring. This makes sense, though. The knowingly
mental state is used to define the culpability baseline in just those cases where the social
utility of the conduct is high in relation to the gravity of the potential harm. See supra text
accompanying notes 152-60. When the social utility of the conduct is high in relation to the
gravity of the harm, it makes sense to demand more by way of culpability, and less by way
of caution, at the information-gathering, belief-formation stage of the decision-making
process.
225 See People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920, 926 (Cal. 2002) (framing the question as what
"a reasonable person would believe").
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probability of the critical fact's non-existence sufficient to negate "belief'
in the critical fact.
In both the reasonable belief standard and the realistic possibility
standard, the reasonable-person construct plays roughly the same role that it
plays in Model Penal Code's definition of negligence. That is, the
reasonable person serves not only to provide a perspective from which to
calculate the risk ex ante,226 but also to provide a moral standard against
which to evaluate the defendant.227 It serves to focus the evaluative
question whether, in the words of the Code commentary, the actor deserves
"condemnation. 228 Bear in mind, though, that the evaluative question is
narrower here than in the case of negligence.
The evaluative question is narrower because it goes only to the
information-gathering, probability-estimating stage of the decision-making
process. Recall that the reasonableness of a belief depends on whether the
actor has exercised due care in forming the belief, but does not depend on
whether the belief is sufficient in degree of certainty to justify action under
the circumstances in which the actor finds himself.229  Thus, in the
application of the reasonable belief standard, the evaluative question for the
jury is just whether the defendant's carelessness in the formation of his
beliefs (or probability estimates) deserves condemnation.230 Much the same
thing would be true under the reasonable person component of a realistic
possibility standard. The evaluative question for the jury would just be
whether the defendant was culpable in failing to be aware of a probability
exceeding the defined threshold.
Granted, in deciding what degree of care the sexual abuse defendant
should have exercised in the information-gathering, probability-estimating
stage of the decision-making process, the jury would have to assign a value
226 Hurd & Moore, supra note 32, at 358-59 (suggesting that one possible reason why
courts "conceptualiz[e] negligence in terms of a hypothetical reasonable person" is to
"specify an epistemic vantage point from which a risk is to be assessed").
227 Id. at 359 (suggesting that another purpose of the reasonable-person construct is to
permit deviation from a strict justifiability calculus: "On this view, the reasonable person
may be the (deontologically) moral person, not the one who correctly sums the
consequentialist balance of benefits versus risks"); see also Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology
of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REv. 249, 255 (1996) (arguing that the "calculus of risk" required
by the Hand formula does not exhaust the intuitive content of the reasonable person test).
229 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 238, 241 (1985).
229 Johnson, supra note 6, at 5 16-21.
230 There is nothing incoherent in this. Indeed, the Model Penal Code's provisions on
self-defense explicitly require this very determination. They impose liability for negligence
or recklessness if the actor, though he believed that force was necessary in self-defense, was
"reckless or negligent in having such belief or in acquiring or failing to acquire any
knowledge or belief that is material to the justifiability of his use of force .... MODEL
PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.09(2).
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to the gravity of the harm that accompanies sexual abuse. This inquiry
would raise the same concerns about the jury's inaptitude that the
recklessness and criminal negligence inquiries raised.2 3' The difference lies
in the scope and importance of the jury's gravity-of-harm determination. In
criminal negligence and recklessness, the jury has to rely on its gravity-of-
harm determination both in calculating the acceptable level of risk and in
deciding whether the defendant was culpable in failing to perceive or in
disregarding a risk exceeding this magnitude.232 The hybrid realistic
possibility standard counts as an improvement on criminal negligence and
recklessness because it takes the first of these calculations-the
justifiability calculation-out of the jury's hands. If the hybrid standard is
not perfect-if it has the potential to demand too little of defendants
cognitively-it is still much better than the alternatives.
In any event, the real point here is that the realistic possibility standard
provides much the same assurance of culpability that the criminal
negligence standard does, and exactly the same assurance of culpability that
the reasonable belief standard does. For good measure, it also provides
actors with advance notice of precisely what probability of harm will
trigger liability. If, for example, a legislature were to adopt a realistic
possibility standard for sexual abuse, a person who was considering
engaging in sexual intercourse with a partner of indeterminate age would
know precisely what degree of risk was acceptable and would be able to
shape his or her conduct accordingly. In this respect, the standard serves to
guarantee culpability in the same way that general intent statutes do-by
telling citizens in advance "what they may and may not do.,
233
VI. CONCLUSION
For decades academics have bemoaned the persistence of strict
liability for sexual abuse,234 to very little effect. 235 What they have not done
is construct a truly viable alternative to strict liability. This is no small
thing, for the persistence of strict liability is largely attributable to the lack
of a viable alternative. For right or wrong, courts are convinced that the
existing alternatives to strict liability "would strip the victims of the
231 See supra text accompanying notes 93-131.
232 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 516-18.
233 Duff, supra note 52, at 961 (describing the benefits of per se rules).
234 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 2, at 383; Loewy, supra note 2, at 100; Myers, supra
note 3, at 135; Vance, supra note 3, at 451-52.
235 See Carpenter, supra note 2, at 385-91 (providing a table showing current status of
state laws).
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protection which the law exists to afford., 236 It is for this reason, and not
because judges are somehow incapable of understanding the arguments
against strict liability, that strict liability has persisted.237 The answer to
strict liability, then, lies in constructing a new alternative.
Probably the most appealing aspect of the new alternative proposed
here is its unimaginativeness. This alternative does not remake the existing
conceptual landscape of criminal culpability; it just casts light on an
unmapped comer of that landscape. Juries and legislatures have always
shared the responsibility for determining whether the risk created by a
defendant's conduct is unjustifiable. Where crimes of recklessness and
criminal negligence are concerned, the jury makes this justifiability
determination by, in effect, assigning values to (1) the gravity of the
potential harm, (2) the utility of conduct, and (3) the probability that the
harm will occur. Where general intent offenses are concerned, the
legislature makes the same calculations in advance. There is nothing
particularly imaginative, then, about the idea of dividing the three factors in
the justifiability calculus between the legislature and the jury, in accordance
with those institutions' very different competencies. Nor is there likely to
be anything politically controversial about such a division.
Finally, it deserves passing mention that the new mens rea proposed
here might be useful in settings other than child sexual abuse. It might be
useful, for example, in the law of environmental crime, where courts and
legislatures have struggled over the choice of an appropriate mens rea and,
as in the law of sexual abuse, often have opted for strict liability.238 The
new mens rea might also be useful in the law of rape, particularly with
respect to the defense of reasonable but mistaken belief as to consent.239
Where a defendant raises this defense, the jury will face much the same
difficulty in defining the acceptable risk that it faces in sexual abuse
236 State v. Holmes, 920 A.2d 632, 636 (N.H. 2007) (quoting State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d
759, 769 (R.I. 1998)).
237 Id. (explaining that "[t]he reason that mistake of fact as to the [child]'s age constitutes
no defense is, not that these like public welfare offenses require no mens rea, but that a
contrary result would strip the victims of the protection which the law exists to afford").
238 Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes:
The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL L. 1165, 1166, 1179-88 (1995). Indeed, some courts
appear already to have moved toward requiring only awareness of a slight risk to the
environment. See United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 966 (2d Cir. 1993) (interpreting
Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to require proof that the defendant
charged with disposing hazardous waste without a permit knew that substance disposed of
was potentially harmful to others or potentially harmful to the environment).
239 See Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About




cases. 240 There is a powerful case to be made that the legislature, not the
jury, should define the acceptable risk of being wrong about a partner's
consent.
240 See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 110-13 (2002) (arguing
that admission of evidence of rape victim's sexual history, by triggering "old prejudices
around women's sexuality," would subvert the jury's application of the reasonable-mistake
defense).
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